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A large number of Section 236 subsidized housing
developments are facing financial difficulties. They
have been unable to generate sufficient income to cover
operating costs and debt service. As a result many sub-
sidized housing developments have gone into default. The
issue of subsidized housing facing default has important
rampfications. Events leading to and leading after fore-
closure has negative repercussions on all parties concerned,
espgacially- on low and moderate income families who live
in these developments. The greatest effect is the reduc-
tions of decent housing to these families.
There exist at present no operational national housing
"workout" strategies, nor any definition of the federal
government's role in resuing defaulted or about to default
multi-family housing.
To analyze issues surrounding distressed subsidized
housing, in this thesis we will examine 1) the Section
236 development/management process, to show where it went
wrong and how problems arise; 2) how HUD currently deals
with the situation; ~and 3) why additional mechanisms are
needed to ameliorate it.
In an effort to reach a better understanding of where
HUD went wrong and what new solutions might be possible,
housing built under a State housing finance agency, the
Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency (MHFA), will be dis-
cussed. Methods used by the MHFA in dealing with financi-
ally troubled developments will be studied.
Thesis Supervisor: Langley C. Keyes
Title: Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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INTRODUCTION
As part of the Great Society program, President Lyndon Johnson
proposed the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968. Section 236
of the Act committed federal subsidies to the development of multi-
family housing for people whose income was above that required for
acceptance to public housing, but below that needed to afford a decent
apartment on the conventional market. Section 236 provided federal
insurance for private forty year mortgage loans for projects sponsored
by "limited-dividend" and "non-profit" entities. Section 236 also
provided for monthly payments from the government directly to the
mortgage lender, on behalf of the project owner. The amount of the
monthly government payment to the lender was to be equal to the dif-
ference between the payments that would be required for principal,
interest, and the mortgage insurance premium at the market rate mort-
gage and the payments that would be required for principal, interest,
and mortgage insurance premiums if the mortgage carried an interest
rate of one percent.
The purpose of the Section 236 program was to stimulate the par-
ticipation of private enterprise in the construction of multi-family
housing for low and moderate income families. The adoption of a complex
system of tax incentives with long-term tax roll-over provisions was to
permit private enterprise to play a major role in the housing develop-
ment process as well as in the operation of completed units. One year
after its enactment, multi-family housing starts for subsidized housing
had soared. Multi-family subsidized housing starts had risen to over
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124,000 units in 1971. Between 1969 and 1971, more FHA-insured multi-
family units were provided than had been provided under Section 202,
Section 221 [d] 3 Below Market Interest Rate (BMIR), during the decade
from 1959 through 1968. From 1968 through 1971, 240,490 units were
built under the Section 236 program, making up 18.3 percent of all sub-
sidized housing built in that period.
Today a large number of Section 236 subsidized housing develop-
ments are facing financial difficulties. They have been unable to ge-
nerate sufficient income to cover operating costs and debt service.
The costs of utilities and taxes are rising so rapidly that the stream
of income from tenants cannot carry the projects. The soaring costs
are particularly troublesome because owners of subsidized projects
need HUD's approval to raise rents, and HUD wants to keep rents within
reach of eligible tenants. While HUD has approved rent increases of as
much as fifty percent at some projects; such approval has sometimes
worsened problems by increasing the number of vacancies, or by sparking
rent strikes by angry tenants. As a result, many subsidized housing
developments have gone into default. By the end of June, 1975, HUD
either owned or held unpaid mortgages on nearly 2,000 apartment buil-
dings containing over 100,000 dwelling units. Property values and
unpaid mortgages, both subsidized and unsubsidized combined, totaled
$2.5 billion.5
Financial trouble in housing projects has mainly been caused by
inflation driving up operating and maintenance costs to a level where
they cannot be recovered through rent increases. Many of these develop-
ments are located in economically depressed areas in which the residents
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are unable to pay rent increases. Many owners of financially stricken
buildings are churches or other non-profit organizational sponsors who
lack the necessary operating cash resources, the kind of occupants who
can afford rent increases, and the necessary managerial skills.
Besides governmental interaction, other events have had profound
effects on housing from 1968 to the present. The nation experienced
unusually high rates of inflation. The inflation resulted in steep
increases in operating costs for both low income public housing and
federally-subsidized low-moderate income housing. Management companies
were unable to provide for building maintenance under the original cash
flow projections and rent leveles. Other events which influenced the
financial capacity of federally subsidized housing were the energy
crisis and subsequent increases in fuel costs. Those increases re-
quired greater sums to be allocated for heating and electricity, an
additional strain on operating expenses.
The unforeseen increase in operating expenses contributed largely
to the financial distress of subsidized housing projects. When the
program received its original authorizations, no attention was given to
the possible need for separate operating subsidies.
HUD has proposed legislation to supply necessary funds to deal
with part of the problem faced by subsidized housing, but President
e
Ford vetoed the Emergency Housing Act on June 24, 1975. The Act would
have addressed the foreclosure dilemma by providing operating subsidies
to projects under financial stress.
When owners have defaulted, banks and other lending institutions
have turned over the unpaid mortgages to HUD and collected their loans.
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In the first ten months of fiscal 1975, HUD found itself responsible
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for 105 buildings carrying $110.3 million of unpaid mortgages.
HUD has had to assume responsibility for debt collection after
mortgage debt is turned back to it by financial institutions. If a
financial remedy that would reinstate the mortgage could not be found,
HUD has had to foreclose on these properties. The overall drain on
the Federal Housing Administration's (FHA) revenues now exceeds $1.8
billion. In a sale of a foreclosure property, the government recovers
about forty-seven cents on the dollar. In the first ten months of
fiscal 1975, HUD sold seventy-seven projects to recover $67.2 million
owners had not paid. HUD lost $33.3 million, or an average of $5,654
on each of the 5,889 apartments in the buildings sold.
The selling of foreclosed multi-family developments has jeopar-
dized the housing of thousands of low income and moderate income
tenants. The reason is that projects usually must be sold without the
federal subsidies, thus eliminating this housing as a resource for low
to moderate income households.
The multi-family housing failures are concentrated in about twenty
large cities, including Detroit, Boston, Dallas, San Francisco, Los
Angeles, New York, and Cleveland. These housing failures hurt the tax
base of these cities and also the supply of decent housing for low
income families.
Some of the problems faced by subsidized housing are actually
inherent to the program structure. Subsidized housing programs have
come under serious attack from all quarters. FHA processing was too
4
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slow and project development was eimeshed in red tape. Even with FHA
reviews, construction was shoddy and architectural designs were poor.
In some communities the subsidized units were placed in the least
desireable areas; that is, they were placed in environmentally dreary
locations (e.g., near a garbage dump) or in too-crowded poor residen-
tial neighborhoods. In other communities, too few of these units were
built in urban and rural poverty areas, accessible to the populations
they were meant to serve. In still others, they were built in areas
where school facilities, social services, etc., were unavailable to
poor families. The subsidies offered were not sufficient and did not
aid the families who most needed them.
Private enterprise was making large profits at the expense of low
and moderate income families through the sale of syndications to inves-
tors for tax shelter purposes. Tax incentives did not work and offered
too much gain for too little work in some cases, and too little gain
for too much work in other cases. Management was poor and there were
no incentives to make it better.
In an attempt to deal with financially troubled developments,
HUD exempted (1974) federally subsidized developments from local rent
Io
control. Since January 5, 1973, a moratorium on new Section 236 de-
velopments has been in effect as a result of foreclosures, which has
tremendously decreased production of housing for low and moderate
income families. As of January, 1975, HUD has also declared a mora-
torium on foreclosures of nonprofit subsidized projects on which it
holds the mortgage, rescuing about one hundred projects from default.'2
The Nixon Administration tried to iron out the difficulties in the
5
program. Goals for the production of housing were changed from quan-
tity to quality. Production slowed to a crawl amidst cries of complaint,
not only from the private sector which was utilizing these programs, but
also from many of the tenant groups being served by new subsidized units.
Problems overwhelmed the program and the federal government was in danger
of becoming the nation's largest slum landlord. As of this date, no
other formal decision has been reached that could resolve the problems of
distressed subsidized housing. No simple answers exist for the financial
problems that subsidized housing is encountering. There exist at present
no operational national housing "workout" strategies, nor any definition
of the federal government's role in rescuing defaulted or about to de-
fault multi-family housing.
To analyze issues surrounding distressed subsidized housing, in
this thesis we will examine 1) the Section 236 development/management
process, to show where it went wrong and how problems arise; 2) how HUD
currently deals with the situation; and 3) why additional mechanisms
are needed to ameliorate it.
In an effort to reach a better understanding of where HUD went wrong
and what new solutions might be possible, housing built under a State
housing finance agency, the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency (MHFA),
will be discussed. Methods used by the MHFA in dealing with financially
troubled developments will be studied.
The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter One provides a descrip-
tion and analysis of the original structure and goals of the Section 236
program, with particular emphasis on the system for sponsor participa-
6
tion created by the program.
Chapter Two describes the processing and development of a Section
236 project, with emphasis on the development/management process.
Chapter Three focuses on typical mechanisms used by HUD to deal
with financially troubled projects.
As a comparative analysis, Chapter Four discusses the structure
and goals of the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency (MHFA). Chapter
Five discusses the development/management process under the MHFA, and
Chapter Six describes the MHFA's efforts to deal with financially
troubled developments.
Chapter Seven closely examines a specific aid to financially
troubled developments, the workout, with particular emphasis on its
legal and financial ramifications. Chapter Eight looks at further
mechanisms to avoid foreclosure, most as yet untried by the MHFA and
HUD. Chapter Nine discusses change of ownership in HUD developments
as a means of keeping them available to low and moderate income
families.
In our concluding remarks, we discuss new alternatives that may
be used in the future to bring about more responsible long-term owner-
ship/management of subsidized housing.
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Chapter One
THE SECTION 236 PROGRAM STRUCTURE
In order to understand how the section 236 program got into so
much trouble, it is necessary to understand the operating assumptions
and guidelines which have structured it. The purpose of the Section
236 program, which was a replacement of Section 221 [d] 3, was to pro-
mote the development of low and moderate income hosuing. Under the
prior Section 221 [d] 3, the FHA was authorized to insure a private
mortgage loan for the development of multi-family housing projects.
The loans under this Section bore only a three percent "below market"
interest rate. Another government instrument, the Federal National
Mortgage Association (FNMA), had to buy the mortgage receivable from
the private lender upon the completion of construction.1
From 1961 through 1967, there was only a limited amount of private
housing that was developed under the Section 221 [d] 3 BMIR program.
The housing activity was outside rural areas and center city areas where
housing was often most needed.
The reports of the President's Commission on Civil Disorders (1968)
and the President's Commission on Urban Housing (1968) predicted drastic
social disintegration in the cities if more low and moderate income
housing were not forthcoming. Some of the reasons for the absxence of
private sector activity were the lack of adequate financial incentives
and the high amount of risk involved to developers, builders and inves-
tors for construction in rural areas. The problem was that under the
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FHA's multi-family program, low interest rates and extended mortgage
terms all reduced rents, but limited the cash return to project
owners. According to the regulation under the Section 221 [d]3 BMIR
program, owners' s cash flow from equity (ten percent of total project
cost), is limited to a six percent return.4 Thus, there was little
reason for a private developer to undertake the development of low and
moderate income housing projects, as opposed to the far less risky,
and potentially far more regarding alternative of developing conven-
tional residential housing.
To overcome the inadequacies of Section 221[d]3 BMIR, a new pro-
gram was formulated (Section 236) which was structured to promote
developer and sponsor participation in the production of low and mode-
rate income housing. Under Section 236, housing is developed by pri-
vate builders. Projects are financed through private lending insti-
tutions and the mortgages are insured by the FHA at a market interest
rate. Each tenant pays either a basic rental (calculated on the
assumption of a mortgage with a one percent interest rate), or twenty-
five percent of his adjusted income, whichever is greater. Rent
collected by the mortgagor in excess of basic charges is returned to
HUD. Ownership is restricted to nonprofit and limited profit sponsors.
The purpose of this subsidy is to expand low income housing
production by making returns on investment under the HUD subsidy pro-
grams competitive withthe return on conventionally financed construc-
tion. The extension of the mortgage term to forty years and the
interest reduction subsidy, providing lower debt service, usually make
rents twenty-five percent lower than those for conventional apartments.
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This allows builders to locate developments in areas where tenants'
incomes traditionally have been insufficient to meet open market
rents.
The purpose of both the Tax Reform Act of 1969 and the Housing
and Urban Development Act of 1968 was to change previous programs by
providing tax aid and other incentives for the private development of
low and moderate income housing.J Under Section 236, substantial tax
benefits are afforded to project owners. Under the prior Section
221 [d]3 program, HUD and the FNMA made a three percent interest rate
loan for the development of the project. Under a three percent mort-
gage schedule, the owner's initial payments consisted primarily of
nondeductible principle amortization. By contrast, under the Section
236 program, an owner can execute a mortgage for the market rate of
interest up to a maximum rate specified by HUD.
A portion of the debt service is paid by HUD to the lender on
behalf of the low income tenants. For federal income tax purposes,
the owner is required to treat HUD's interest reduction payments to
the lender as gross income, as though they were at the higher rate.
However, the owner is permitted to deduct the full market interest
provided under the terms of the mortgage on his income tax.& Under
a market rate interest mortgage, a greater portion of the owner's
initial debt service payments consists of deductible interest than
was the case under a Section 221 [d]3 three percent interest rate
mortgage.
The major investment incentive in a Section 236 development is
the tax shelter that it can provide to persons in a fifty percent or
10
higher income tax bracket. Under the 1969 Tax Reform Act, housing pro-
jects insured by the FHA under Section 236 are subject to the same tax
benefits afforded all new residential property. The Tax Reform Act
permits continued application of accelerated depreciation (double-
declining balance or sum-of-the-years digits methods) to all new resi-
dential property. But for investors in low to moderate income housing
it also provides: 1) favorable capital gains treatment of sales
proceeds representing the excess of accelerated-over-straight-line
depreciation, and 2) generous roll-over provisions.
Because of the special tax provisions under the 1969 Tax Reform
Act, investments in 236 projects appear fairly attractive to high
income individuals interested in sheltering income. One of the incen-
tives derives from the rule for recapture of depreciation (that is,
the gain on a sale or a portion of it which is in excess of straight-
line depreciation is taxable at ordinary income rates, rather than as
capital gains). The Tax Reform Act substantially changed the recapture
rules so that accelerated depreciation on nonresidential property is
completely recaptured, regardless of the holding period. On residen-
tial rental housing however, recapture was increased to one-hundred
percent for the first one-hundred months only, after which percent
recapture declines by one percent per month for the next one-hundred
months. Thus, after sixteen years and eight months, the entire gain
is considered a capital gain.
With respect to government-sponsored housing, Congress created
an even greater tax break by preserving the pre-1969 recapture rules)
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which provided for no recapture after a ten year holding period. This
provision suggests a greater possibility of trading ordinary losses for
capital gain upon sale; but the FHA restricts sale or even refinancing
for a period of up to twenty years. Sale is allowed only to an ap-
proved tenant group or cooperative, but cash return on such a sale is
restricted.1t
In an attempt to encourage sale to tenant groups or cooperatives
and production of government-sponsored housing, a tax "rollover" pro-
vision was established. Under the "rollover" provision, sale of a
Section 236 project is not to be currently taxed if the seller
reinvests the proceeds of the sale in another federally-assisted
project. It was intended to be a tax incentive for conversion to
tenant ownership, but the provision has never operated as such suc-
cessfully. The sale price of a project was fixed by HUD, which
created little incentive for electing the rollover; little cash gene-
rated and the depreciable base for the replacement project is further
reduced by the amount of gain not recognized, thus reducing the tax
shelter otherwise available in the second project. The only advan-
tage of the rollover provision is a possible escape valve for a situ-
ation in which a project has reached the crossover point at the end
of twenty years, but cannot be sold on the open market for more than
the mortgage. As a result of the reduction of the depreciable base,
by reason of tax losses taken by investors, a substantial gain would
be realized. Since the partnership would have no cash to pay the tax
on the gain, it might prefer to sell to a tenant group and use the
rollover. 12
These tax incentives have a direct impact on investors, but are
intended through their indirect effects to function as consumer-use
subsidies. Their objective is to make capital resources available for
production of low income housing at a cost to the developer that is
competitive with alternative investments of comparable risk. Since an
accelerated form of depreciation is taken, many of the tax benefits
are used up by the end of the seventh year. At this point the project
is of little use to the investor. The only financial reason why the
investor would want to keep the project would be to save it from fi-
nancial difficulty, because, in the event of foreclosure before the
120 month period, the investor is subject to recapture (deductions
taken in excess of straight-line depreciation which are subject to
taxation at regular income tax rates, instead of at lower capital
gains rates).
The financial rewardsgenerated from the development for inves-
tors are from an indirect source in the tax system. The gain realized
has no relationship to how well the project is managed. Many of the
tax benefits are generated in the early years of the development and
after this point there is no real financial incentive to hold inves-
tors to the project, except to avoid a tax liability from depreciation
recapture. The benefits generated have no relationship to ownership-
management performance.
Builder/Sponsor Profit Risk Allowance (BSPRA)
The actual initial equity required by sponsor/builders is small,
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making building under the Section 236 program attractive. Because of
the small amount of equity required, the sponsor has little to loose
if a development gets into trouble. He would be less willing to work
to resolve a problem, therefore, if he has little of his own equity
in a development. Also, the small equity requirement permits under-
financed sponsors to participate in the program, sponsors who are
least able to financially support a development if it falls into fi-
nancial difficulty. Section 236 offers the sponsor with less risk
as compared to conventional apartments, where actual cash equity
requirements can be from twenty to thirty percent of the total re-
placement cost. This allows relatively easy entry into the program.
A financial profile of a hypothetical Section 236 project is
shown in Figure I. In this Figure, item five refers to the Builder
Sponsor Profit Risk Allowance (BSPRA), which is given by the FHA if
an identity of interest between the mortgagor and the contractor
exists. BSPRA is included in the replacement cost.
Item eight refers to'Stated Equity", which equals ten percent of
replacement cost - in our example, $150,000. The amount of the di-
vidend to the owners from the project is limited to six percent of the
stated equity - in our case, $9,000. BSPRA can be used as part of
the equity required. The builder sponsor normally leaves the BSPRA
in the project as equity and is able to build the project with little
cash. Compared with conventional projects, 236 developments permit
a much higher loan-to-equity ratio. Actual cash equity can be as low
as one and one-half percent of replacement cost - $23,000 in our
example. 14
There are certain out-of-pocket expenses that are not allowed as
part of the mortgage: construction loan fees in excess of two percent
of the total cost, permanent loan discounts (when the mortgage sells
12.below par), and working capital. Section 236 requires the limited
dividend equity to show a working capital equal to two percent of the
mortgage. In our example in Figure 1, total out-of-pocket costs
equal $63,227.
These out-of-pocket expenses illustrate another feature of the
236 program. If the final construction costs exceed the estimated
construction costs, the cost overruns are the responsibility of the
mortgagor-sponsor. However, if construction costs are higher than
estimated, but the interest expense is lower, the two may offset
one another. If total final costs are lower than estimated costs,
the out-of-pocket costs (e.g., discount, construction loan fees and
contingencies) and cost overruns may become part of the mortgage, as
long as the final mortgage does not exceed the original estimate.
In 236 projects where the interest-assistance subsidy effective-
ly reduces the interest rate on a forty-year mortgage to one percent,
the developer has a dramatically low constant on themortgage (a 3.3
percent constant, compared to a 10.4 percent constant on eight percent
interest for twenty years). The reduced constant serves to reduce
rents for the apartments in a 236 project. Thus, these projects
supposedly need not face the normal risks of competition, since they
offer rents with with few conventional projects can compete.
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The Return to the Builder-Sponsor
Since tax benefits generated from a 236 project are greater than
what the builder-sponsor can use, it is generally more profitable to
sell the project to investors. As previously mentioned, a Section 236
mortgage provides almost all of the capital needed to permit con-
struction of a multi-family housing project profitable to the sponsors
and to the members of the development team. This profit is obtained
through operation of the current tax system and the sponsor's ability
to raise cash by selling the favorable tax characteristics of the
project to others. A sponsor can sell a project for greater than the
ten percent stated equity, twelve to twenty percent of the mortgage.Ik
This kind of sale to investors is the major source of profit. A
sponsor usually is able to obtain these profits within three years
after construction of a 236 development. So, in effect, whatever may
happen to a development after this period is of little concern to the
sponsor; he has already received the maximum financial benefits and
has little at stake in the project. There is no personal liability
for him in the permanent mortgage, because of the exculpatory pro-
vision that frees the builder-developer from personal liability for
debt. Figure 2 shows the amount of profit a developer could make on
a project.
Extension benefits through the tax system is available only to
those projects that avoid foreclosure for a number (three to six) of
years; wealthy investors will pay less and demand higher projected
returns for projects in urban or rural poverty areas, because of the
16
greater risk of financial insolvency. Likewise, such investors usu-
ally accept a lower return and pay more for an older project in a
suburban neighborhood that has few unusual rent-up or management
problems, and which may even offer some prospect of a residual value
at the end of the twenty year projection period.
The tax benefits generated do not vary with the project's loca-
tion or the risk entailed. The sponsor's compensation is dependent
on the amount he can raise through the sale of tax benefits. The
sponsor would get a lower amount of compensation on risky projects;
thus the sponsor's compensation decreases as the risk increases. The
tax benefits available to a project of a given size do not vary with
the risks entailed in the project. In summary, the compensation
varies inversely with the risks involved.
The method of compensation for the sponsor is worked out through
the tax incentive system, on which investors base the price they are
willing to pay to the sponsor. This systfn'lweighs the expectation of
reward against the risks taken. A sponsor is normally entitled to
compensation that is commensurate to the risks involved. The indirect
method by which the sponsor realized his compensation and the inflex-
ibility of a tax incentive systte, based on a depreciation format do
not reflect the amount of risk taken by the sponsor.
The Return to Limited-Partner Investors
The major gains realized to investors have almost no relationship
to the ownership/management performance of the development. Gains are
17
almost guaranteed and risks to investors are minimized through the
structuring of investment. Returns on investment are high enough
so that after a few years of operation, the investor can recover
his investment. The only risk to investors is the threat of fore-
closure, which can produce a tax liability.
The risk on FHA syndications is usually structured so that
only a part of the investment is ever at risk to the investors.
This is done by staging the investment outlay. Even if the business
of renting and operating the project is unsuccessful, the tax
shelter achieved to the date of foreclosure normally outweighs the
tax on the gain resulting from the foreclosure and the loss of the
investment capital; and so results in a net gain to the investors.
Limited-partners are only liable for the amount of capital invested,
no more.
In the event of a foreclosure of a project by a partnership,
the gain realized for fedreal tax purposes is, in effect, measured
by the difference between 1) the amount realized on the sale, and
2) the partnership's depreciated cost for the project. In the case
of low and moderate income projects, the entire gain on any such sale
is taxed at capital gains rates, unless the sale occurs during the
first ten years after the date on which depreciation of the project
commences. If the project is foreclosed during this ten year period,
all or a portion of the gain is subject to depreciation recapture
and is taxed at ordinary income rates. The portion of the gain
subject to depreciation recapture is an amount equal to the diffe-
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rence between the aggregate amount of depreciation claimed by the
partnership and the amount which would have been allowed if the
straight-line depreciation method had been used. 1!
Analysis of Section 236 projects shows that most investors
received an after-tax return on investment of between eighteen and
twenty-seven percent for fifty percent bracket taxpayers; for seventy
percent bracket taxpayers, the after-tax return may be as high as
thirty-five percent. The average equity investment for such investors
has been between fourteen and sixteen percent of the mortgage.
The investment recovery period is the time required to recoup
equity investment through tax savings and cash flow generated by the
project. The recovery period ranges from three to six years. Between
seventy-five and one-hundred percent of the investment is tax deduc-
tible in the first year. Under the present incentive system, the tax
benefits run out before twenty years have pass-d. The FHA-insured
mortgages generally run for forty years. After the twentieth year,
the ownership entity has little positive financial reason for holding
onto the project.
Conclusion
The major housing production incentive for sponsors to partici-
pate in under Section 236 is the generation of tax shelter benefits
which are sold to investors. Thus it is reasonable to conclude that
the government has focused far too much attention on the incentives
needed to stimulate the development and building of low and moderate
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income housing, and far too little attention on the incentives needed
to insure the viable long-term ownership and management of multi-family
housing.
The ownership of low and moderate income housing is seen as a
burden that must be borne by developers or builders in order to obtain
profits which may later have to be used for the actual development and
construction of multi-family units. The investors are interested in
avoiding an early sale because of the large amounts in taxes that would
have to be paid, which could severely reduce the net after-tax return
of the project. Because of the fact that there is no further substan-
tial profit generation from the development, there is no incentive to
do anything more than keep the project from being foreclosed. The
party actually responsible for the operation of the project on behalf
of inactive, limited-partner/investors is the developer, who is usually
the generally partner, but who has little or none of his funds invested
in the project. Except for the developer's desire to maintain credi-
bility and and a favorable reputation in the investment community and
with HUD/FHA for the sake of future Section 236 projects, he has little
incentive to keep the project operating, much less to provide superior
housing services, since the economic benefits have been extracted at
the outset of the project.
The "rollover" option does not provide effective incentives for
the developer to sell to the tenants. The only conditions under which
Section 236 owners would be interested in selling a project to a
tenant group would be 1) if the tenant group could pay a price well in
20
excess of the outstanding mortgage balance, and probably well in excess
of any amount which could be refinanced, or 2) if the developer is
willing to obtain less than his maximum profit from a second project
by offering it as a bail-out investment for his partners in a first
project which has become impossible to operate.
The Section 236 program was mainly intended to promote the pro-
duction of housing without regard to long-term viability. HUD officials
ordered local FHA offices to low customary underwriting standards in
order to increase approvals of housing proposals. Because of the
emphasis on production, concern for economic viability was not of pri-
mary importance. Many units were built in weak market areas. These
area offices, under pressure to produce, deliberately lowered operating
expense budgets to "make numbers work". They justified this by rea-
soning that rents could later be increased to cover operating costs.
This strategy might work if operating expenses remain constant; but
economic effects have caused epenses to escalate to a point where it
has become beyond the ability of tenants to pay.
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Chapter Two
THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS UNDER HUD'S 236 PROGRAM
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the weaknesses in the
development/management process that are contributing factors to the
problems of distressed subsidized housing. A step-by-step analysis
of procedures outlined under the Section 236 program follows, in
order to illuminate the inherent weaknesses in the program. The
description outlines the pre-feasibility state through commitment
and ends with the final closing.
Pre-feasibility to Final Closing
A developer has located a piece of land which is suitable for
the kind of development he seeks to build. He carries out the
market research necessary to determine whether the demand for sub-
sidized housing exists for that location and whether the rents that
would be generated at HUD prescribed levels would be sufficient to
justify the investment. With this basic information collected, the
developer has a pre-feasibility conference with the local FHA office.
At the pre-feasibility conference the developer describes the
nature of the project. Feasibility is chacked by comparing the
rough estimate of rent levels and operating costs in the proposed
project with the current rent levels and vacancy rates in the area.
The purpose of the conference is to let the HUD office know of the
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developer's plans so that HUD has the opportunity to offer its view of
the project's feasibility at an early stage. At this stage, the HUD
office indicates what the chances are for receiving na allocation of
subsidies. If the office believes that the market in an area is
"soft" or if the office is short of subsidy funds, an attempt is made
to keep a sponsor from wasting his time in submitting an application.
In cases in which HUD gives a favorable judgment on the potential of
the project, the developer then begins to work on the subsequent
stages, which include a management plan for the project and a letter
of feasibility.a
The key part of the application for a letter of feasibility
is the submission of FHA Form 2013, which is the application for
project mortgage insurance. The feasibility of the project is indi-
cated by the financial calculations included on this form. The
information supplied determines whether the proposed rent levels
can support the mortgage payments, the operating expenses, and the
six percent cash distribution on the "stated equity". The size of
the mortgage is limited by the rents that can be charged. The amount
of rent that can be charged is restricted by FHA tenant income
limits, which are 135 percent of the limits established for public
housing in that area.
Between one and six months after submittal of the 2013 form and
related documents (such as evidence of site control, personal finan-
cial and credit statements of the sponsor, and equal employment oppor-
tunity certification), the HUD area office calls the proposed sponsor
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in for a feasibility conference. At this conference a more detailed
discussion of market and economic feasibility, project location,
site layout and design, and the proposed management plan takes place.
If HUD finds the project feasible, it establishes target dates,
reserves the subsidy funds required by the project, and issues a
letter of feasibility inviting the potential sponsor to submit an
application for firm (conditional) commitment. A time limit of sixty
to ninty days is set for submittal of this second application.
At this point, the sponsor instructs his architects to draw up
final plans and to refine cost estimates through negotiations with
the contractors, after which another 2013 form is submitted with the
refined cost estimates. If approved, a letter of conditional com-
mitment is issued by HUD.4
The developer negotiates a fixed price with the builder and
then applies for a firm commitment from HUD by submitting a revised
2013 form, accompanied by architectural plans and specifications, a
land survey and a surveyor's certificate. The 2013 form is now based
on firm prices, not estimates. If everything meets proper specifi-
cations, HUD issues a firm commitment for mortgage insurance and the
interest subsidy.
The next stage is the initial closing, at which construction can
begin. With firm commitment, the developer has completed the bulk of
the development work prior to the start of construction. The deve-
loper has met HUD requirements, and HUD has legally bound itself to
supply mortgage insurance and an interest subsidy within specified
limits.
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When ninty-five to ninty-seven percent of the construction is
completed and certified by both architects and HUD inspectors, a Per-
mission to Occupy is issued by HUD. At this point, rental of units
may begin - prior to the last step in the development process, final
closing.
Final closing constitutes the final endorsement of the mortgage
instrument, putting into effect both the insurance on the permanent
loan and subsidization of the mortgage on the completed project.
Determination of Feasibility
The method used for determining feasibility, during initial HUD
development/management processes, places most developments at the
maximum income limits of its potential tenants. This leaves develop-
ments in a bad position to absorb future costs. Much is due to
placing a greater proportion of rents as payment for capital costs
instead of operating costs, because the developer's profits are
generated from the cost of construction.
In filling out 2013 forms, the knowledgeable sponsor generally
begins his work on the application by moving from the "bottom upward".
The 2013 form is the most crucial worksheet since it incorporates
the numbers upon which project rentals and project feasibility are
determined. Thus, a sponsor can look first at the regular income
limits applicable to the jurisdiction in which the project is planned.
By taking twenty-five percent of those income limits based on maximum
family sizes for the types of units planned (e.g., two bedroom units,
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four persons; three bedroom units, six persons), the developer can
calculate the "administrative rent limits" - the maximum amounts
which can be paid by qualified individuals and families for rental
purposes in a Section 236 project. Once these per unit figures have
been obtained, the developer can multiply them by the number of
units (and applicable bedroom distribution) in the project, resul-
ting in the maximum rental charges that can be derived from the
project. Reducing these revenues by a five percent combined vacancy
and collection loss factor provides the figures that are acceptable
to HUD.
The developer now plugs into his calculations the operating,
maintenance, and real estate tax cost estimates obtained from the
local HUD office. These costs, originally set by HUD, were based on
pasp estimates on suburban housing developments. These estimates
turned out to be lower than estimated, especially for inner city
developments, which require higher operating costs. Developers also
have negotiated with HUD offices to lower operating expenses, in order
to allow more funds for construction. Subtracting operating cost
figures from the adjusted gross income usable for rent purposes leaves
an amount that can be assumed to be available for debt service and
allowable cash flow. Thereafter, by capitalizing this figure at the
expected debt service rate (3.3 percent annual constant for a one-
hundred percent subsidized 236 project), the sponsor obtains his
working figure for replacement cost purposes.
Once the developer has this replacement cost figure, he can break
it down into its component parts. At this point he has a rough idea
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as to what he intends to construct on the site. In effect, the pre-
determined replacement cost allows the "numbers" to dictate which
type of construction and which unit sizes are possible. Again, the
sponsor works backwards from the basic replacement cost figures.
Taking out the maximum allowable amounts for architectural, mortgagee,
legal and organizational, special management, and title and recording
fees, the sponsor/developer then calculates the fees to be paid to
the FHA for processing purposes and to the Federal National Mortgage
Association/Government National Mortgage Association (FNMA/GNMA) for
purchase of the permanent mortgage. Then the estimated land value
for the site is plugged into the calculations. Once these figures
have been obtained, the developer subtracts them from the gross
amount left for replacement cost. The remainder constitutes the
amount available for construction, general overhead, insurance, taxes,
and bonding purposes. Within the confines posed by that figure, the
sponsor must decide what can be built in terms of square feet, project
design, and basic amenities.
The fundamental principle for determining feasibility of a 236
project is that the project income be greater than or equal to ex-
penses, and that a market exist which is able to provide the projected
income. Under this subsidized hosuing program the interest is lower,
potential tenants must have incomes within the applicable limits, and
rents must not exceed twenty-five percent of adjusted income. These
income limits put an upper boundary on mortgage amount and operating
costs.
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Through manipulation of various numbers, a sponsor is able to
justify the feasibility of a development. Manipulation of these
numbers has certain ramafications to a development's future via-
bility. Historically, the operational cost limits set by HUD to
determine feasibility for a 236 project were unrealistically low.5
Sponsors have used maximum payments by the tenants with the highest
qualifying incomes in the jurisdiction to determine feasibility.
Insufficient allowance was made for temporary increases in vacancies,
rent delinquency, operating cost increases, or errors in cost esti-
mates. Actual construction costs have also not permitted for these -
allowances. In actual practice feasibility was achieved on paper, but
with no margin for construction cost increases due to inflation and/or
delays. What has occured, therefore, is that sponsors have taken
maximum advantage of production incentives. By taking this advantage,
sponsors have obtained maximum up-front benefits.0
The amount that a sponsor can earn in any project is primarily
a function of the available tax benefits that can be converted to cash
through syndication of the project. Accordingly, it is to the spon-
sor's advantage to build the most expensive structure which would
still be rentable after application of the Section 236 subsidy. The
sponsor has no incentive to achieve overall construction cost savings.
The more the project costs, the higher its depreciable base will be,
and since the sponsor's profit is derived largely from what others
will pay for tax deductions attributable to depreciation, any attempt
to save on costs at this point is directly counter to the sponsor's
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interest. This has led to maximum allowable rents which produces
maximum allowable mortgages, which in turn limits the margin available
to absorb future operating cost increases. Large mortgages mean
larger amounts of profit from the sale of tax shelters. In order to
maximize profits with a Section 236 project, a trade-off between
construction costs and operating costs has had to be made: there has
been the necessity of choosing between a low, unrealistic estimate
of operating costs or less durable construction. Even if a proper
balance is achieved, there is often little margin for increase, since
feasibility is based on maximum allowable rents. Sponsors prefer to
use low estimates of operating costs in order to allow a larger pro-
portion of the rent to support a larger mortgage. Each dollar used
to pay bebt service can increase the mortgage thirty to thirty-five
dollars.1) Since the sponsor is a builder or seller of tax syndi-
cations, increase of the mortgage is an increase of profit. The ma-
jority of the profits in a 236 project is obtained in the production
of the housing, not in its operation.
Another expense which has demanded higher capital expenditure
and increased financial pressure is land cost. Housing programs
operating outside urban areas have no mechanism to prevent land spec-
ulation. This lack has resulted in higher land cost and accordingly
higher rents. Many developers have it in their interest to obtain
high prices in land because additional profits are made thereby. Some
of the high prices are justified due to holding period expenses and
legal fees required for rezoning and to deal with. legal community op-
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position.
Part of the reason why a greater proportion of the rents must go
toward construction is due to a provision in the Davis-Bacon Act of
1931. The Davis-Bacon Act, which is incorporated in the National
Housing Act, requires the Department of Labor to determine "pre-
vailing" relevant wages and fringe benefits, which then become the
minimum standards for workers on federally-funded or sponsored pro-
jects. The purpose is to protect local labor who desire to work on
federally-funded construction from the competition of low-wage non-
local labor. Consequently, contractors building HUD-insured subsi-
dized or non-subsidized multi-family housing projects are required
by law to pay these "prevailing" wages.
Studies of the impact of the Davis-Bacon Act on the construction
industry indicate that "prevailing" wages, as determined by the
Department of Labor, have often been higher than actual market wages
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for local labor. In such instances, the cost of labor to builders
of federally-sponsored projects rises because workers can be engaged
only at premium wages. This means higher rents for those who are in
the worst position to absorb an extra housing cost, the tenants.
Changes in construction costs and interest rates have conside-
rably more impact on basic rents than do changes in operating costs.i
If sponsors were encouraged to lower construction costs, the resulting
projects would be more feasible. There would be more money for opera-
ting expenses, but this might be offset by increased need for mainte-
nance due to lower construction quality. Ultimately, if a delicate
30
balance between operation and construction costs could be maintained,
long-term viability could be achieved.
The Construction Phase
During the construciton period, financial viability can be jeo-
pardized. First, as we have seen a development's total cost can bring
rents up to the maximum permissible limits, which narrows the range
of eligible tenants and eliminates any margin for future cost increases.
Second, cost increases during construction can also lessen or eliminate an
existing safety margin. An increase in the mortgage and an equiva-
lent increase in amortization expenses, without being offset by a
corresponding HUD-approved rent adjustment, can also eliminate any margin
and create deficits.
Further problems may arise that can affect the viability of the
project. Delays in construction, vandalism, and organized opposition
lead to increases in cost and fixed expenses, without a corresponding
increase in project income. Because of the cost limitations set by
HUD, sponsors have understated true cost in order to obtain an FHA
commitment. Cost over-runs and inflation sometimes occur later which
may or may not be covered by a rent increase.
IkIP
The increases in various capital costs during construction has
forced rents to increase to their maximum levels allowable by HUD.
This has hindered the marketability of these units. Rent increases
that are granted for unforseen contingencies have in turn narrowed the
range of eligible families.
31
Construction costs, which have experienced a ten to fifteen per-
cent increase annually due to higher labor and material costs, have
increasingly demanded a greater proportion of the rental dollar.I
These development costs have increased faster than the rent-paying
ability of low and moderate income families.
Management
The sponsor of a subsidized multi-family housing project must
develop an effective management plan and then employ management person-
nel and procedures to carry it out. In implementing the management
plan, a mortgagor frequently obtains the services of a managing agent
and resident manager. The decision to employ a managing agent or to
hire a management staff is usually based on such factors as cost
availability of resources, the size of the project, and the number of
other projects for which the sponsor is responsible.
Once construction is sufficiently advanced and the management
entity is selected and approved by HUD, the task of renting units to
eligible tenants begins. This process involves advertising the avai-
lability of rental units in the project and the screening of prospec-
tive tenants to determine that they meet the eligibility requirements
established by the sponsor and HUD.
During the "normal management" phase, the project manager may
have to perform additional functions, which include "requesting rent
increases when warranted by higher operating costs, and ensuring
that construction defects are discovered and corrected within the
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construction warranty period; and correcting damage when facilities
are destroyed by fire or other accidental causes. "
These added management functions and others, such as collection
of rent arrearages, eviction of tenants and yearly verification of
tenants' income, have consumed a large proportion of management time
which could have been applied to other functions in a development.
Some of these activities (e.g., verification of income), are usually
not part of conventional management duties but must be done without
financial compensation. Added attention to rent collection and te-
nant eviction has been required due to the nature of projects, espe-
cially in core poverty areas where rent arrearages can be abnormally
high. Management fees provided do not allow for adequate management
services to cover these additional duties. This has put extra burdens
on management, for which it does not have necessary resources to cope
with effectively.
Even if management fees were allowed to increase, 236 subsidies
could not pay for such an increase. The 236 subsidy funds are fixed
and there are no subsidy sources to fund increases in operating
costs. When expenses have outrun revenues, the mortgagor will have
asked for deferment of debt service payments to pay for operating ex-
penses. Maintenance will have been defered and housing services will
have deteriorated because of a lack of funds.
Having inadequate funds to meet expenses has occured because HUD
has limited the proportion of net rent allocated to management, and
the sponsor is constrained to keep to the numbers placed on the FHA
33
2013 application. HUD requirements for management staffing and unan-
ticipated legal and staff activities result in higher than actual
costs than those calculated for the feasibility studies. Without the
necessary funds, the sponsor must operate with a less-than-adequate
management staff.
Tenant-Management Relations
The tenant-management relationship is an important factor in the
financial stability of a project. Good management results in lower
operating costs. As the Urban Institute points out:
...Successful management is a blend of firmness,
management responsiveness and occupant concern.
Firmness means getting down and enforcing rules
of behavior for occupants consistently. Manage-
ment responsiveness encompasses heeding requests
by residents for repairing and providing recre-
ational space. Occupant concern covers a wide
range of behavior, attitudes and interests, in-
cluding the way residents care for their apart-
ments and their organized concern for the social
life of the development. 15
A mutually respectful relationship between tenant and manager is
correlated with fewer rent collection problems and careful maintenance
of the property by both parties;KV in turn, the tenant-management re-
lationship is affected by a variety of factors, including the degree
to which management and tenant responsibilities are clearly defined
and communicated, and the degree of accuracy of the tenants' percep-
tion of management's priorities and responsiveness to tenant needs.
The breakdown of communication between management and tenants has
led, in many cases, to neighborhood apathy and to tenant abuse of the
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housing stock, resulting in higher than average maintenance costs.
This problem has been especially evident in subsidized housing
located in the core poverty areas. Lack of funds for adequate main-
tenance and management services has also contributed to tenants'
dissatisfaction, which has led to the breakdown of communication.
Operating Costs
Actual operating costs turn out higher than those predicted in
feasibility studies. One of the major cost items that has escalated
is fuel costs. Fuel costs have increased as much as 200 percent over
original estimates. The FHA has refused to grant rent increases suf-
ficient to bridge the gap between expected and actual fuel costs.
Utility costs and other open-ended costs built into projects from the
beginning have increased beyond the initial, often unrealistic, pro-
jections, while rent increases have been restricted.
Initial maintenance cost estimates were likewiseprojected too low.
Increases in costs were due to greater-than-anticipated frequency of
repairs and higher costs of materials and services. High repair costs
have contributed to tenant abuse and more wear on units with many-child
low income families has occured. Inadequacies in design also have
resulted in higher maintenance costs.
The use of unrealistic estimates of costs in response to rigid
guidelines has resulted in fifty to seventy-five percent underestima-
tions of actual operating costs, on the average. FHA inexperience with
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low income projects has also led to miscalculations of frequency of
repairs, which in turn have led to housing deterioration and the
breakdown of tenant-management relations. Strict limits on building
costs have led to modest design requirements, premature wear, and
increases in operating costs, because of low construction quality.
Increasing tax rates has been one of the fastest rising expenses
in subsidized housing. Because there is no federal policy on tax
rates for subsidized housing, projects are taxed at the discretion of
local assessing departments. Most projects try to obtain special,
low tax assessments. While many special deals are arranged, few are
legally binding. Many cities naturally feel that special deals are
undermining their tax base, and they raise taxes, as has been the case
in Boston.
Operating costs have increased without any available source
being available to pay for these increases. Maximum rent levels have
been achieved, and housing developments are hopelessly locked into a
position which leaves them unable to obtain significant financial
relief.
Rents
Rental limits on 236 projects are 135 percent of local public housing
entry limits. In Section 236 a minimum income is determined by the
regulation that a family may pay no more than thirty-five percent of
its income for rent. For families with incomes below the public
housing limits, leased housing and rent supplement units may be avai-
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lable that allow the families to pay only twenty-five percent of their
adjusted income for rent, with the rent subsidy paying the balance.14
The basic rents tend to stretch to the very limit the ability of
eligible families to pay. Rent increases that arise after occupancy
may be more feasible if the project has been rented to tenants near the
upper income limit than if most tenants were straining their budgets
with thirty to thirty-five percent of their incomes going for rent.
In conventional developments, only a small rent increase may be
needed to cover higher costs, because rents are at higher levels than
subsidized rents are. But in subsidized low income units, a higher
percentage increase is needed to cover the same increase in costs. In
the latter situation, however, there is great resistance to such a rent
increase. Approval of an increase from HUD may take as long as eigh-
teen months because of bureaucratic slowfootedness and the paper work
2o
required. By the time this period has elapsed projects are desperately
in need of funds, since increases are granted on the basis of costs
already incurred, not on projected costs. If managers have to file
another request for another approval, an additional one to five months
will elapse before the increase can be collected. By that time, seven
to twenty-three months may have passed sicne the need for more opera-
ting funds was first documented. This delay contributes to the opera-
ting cost squeeze in subsidized housing projects.
Rent collection has been another problem. Notification proce-
dures can use up valuable time that might otherwise be devoted to other
management tasks.
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Conclusion
In our examination of HUD's development/management phase and pro-
cessing of applicants for Section 236 subsidized multi-family housing,
we have discussed substantial financial and programmatic problems.
A greater portion of the rental dollar has been used to pay for
construction and less has been available for operating costs. Very
little margin has been available to absorb cost increases, and many
original operational cost estimates have been unrealistically low.
HUD has confined management to these original unrealistic figures,
which has resulted in inadequate management services. Even if rent
increases have been granted to meet higher costs, tenants have not
had the financial ability to pay for these increases.
HUD has taken an almost passive role in monitoring and servicing
multi-family projects. HUD has not given enough attention to its
portfolio, which requires daily notice from the local offices to pro-
cess rent increases, review the management and maintenance of insured
projects, and to monitor financial data supplied by the mortgagor.
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Chapter Three
DEALING WITH FINANCIALLY TROUBLED PROJECTS UNDER HUD
Default
HUD defines a fiscal default for a multi-family project as "the
failure of mortgagor to make any payments due under, or required to be
paid pursuant, to the term of the insured mortgage." Default
exists as soon as one mortgage payment is missed. If a fiscal default
occurs and is not remedied within thirty days, the mortgagee is en-
titled to file a claim on the mortgage insured by the FHA. After the
expiration of this thirty-day grace period, the mortgagee may notify
HUD of the default. The mortgagor may receive permission to suspend
payment to the replacement reserve in lieu of rent increases to meet
costs. Financially troubled projects may also use funds in residual
receipt accounts to offset operating deficits. Residual receipts
funds -is income earned from occupancy prior to the final closing.Z
The Federal National Mortgage Association (F&A) is almost always
the permanent mortgagee under HUD subsidized multi-family programs;
sometimes acting for itself, and sometimes acting under contract for
the Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA). The FNMA usu-
ally sends out late notices to mortgagors on both the tenth and
twentieth of each month (the due date is the first of the month), at
times maintains verbal communication with the local HUD office, and
typically notifies HUD officially of the default within fifty days of
its occurence.
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Generally, prior to submission of a default notice, the mortgagee
and/or the mortgagor will have been in informal contact with HUD.
When HUD receives informal notice that a project is in trouble and
that a default may occur, there are several options it may employ.
First, HUD can undertake a study on the causes of the default and
the physical condition of the property, including a suggested plan for
achieving a mortgage reinstatement. During the regulatory period,
after the thirty-day grace period, the mortgagee must decide whether
to assign the mortgage to HUD or to foreclose.
As soon as the causes of default can be determined, the mort-
gagor and HUD usually present a plan of reinstatement to the HUD
central office and the mortgagee. The mortgagee then decides whether
to agree with the plan. The FNMA has sometimes been reluctant to
swerve from its written regulations concerning the assignment of
defaulted project mortgages.5
The reinstatement plan requires some form of mortgagee relief.
It can take several forms. There can be a deferment or a suspension
of deposits to the replacement reserve fund. The suspended payments
do not have to be repaid. If this method is applied early enough, it
can help.
Another form of relief is the deferment of principal payments,
which typically are followed by a recasting or modification of the
remaining mortgage payments. The local office makes recommendations
to the central office, which then modifies or approves the plan. The
modification is for a definite period and may be renewed indefinitely,
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but a practical limitation is that modification effectively increases
principal and interest payments for the rest of the fixed forty year
mortgage period and will, therefore, only increase the fixed costs
for the project in the future.*
If the methods cited above are not found to be applicable, the
mortgagor may then seek a forbearance agreement, which is more exten-
sive than a principal deferment. 'Eorbearance agreements suspend
regular mortgage payments, including interest, during which time the
mortgagor agrees to pay all operating and maintenance expenses and
to meet all mortgage accrual and payments, except principal and
interest. Usually the FNMA, the mortgagee in most cases, will not
agree to any sort of forbearance agreement covering both principal
and interest. It is firm FNMA policy that deferment of interest is
not acceptable.*
Assignment
If all else fails and the mortgagee elects to collect insurance
benefits, the mortgagee has the option to foreclose the loan and
convey the title to HUD or to assign the mortgage to HUD. The usual
procedure is assignment, which is faster and less costly than fore-
closure to the mortgagee.
Once the mortgagee has made his choice, HUD must process the
claim for insurance benefits, making sure that the mortgagee has met
his obligations. When the mortgagee has assigned the mortgage to HUD,
all of its responsibilities end. HUD must establish a servicing pro-
gram and undertake the routine collection of rents, formerly performed
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by the mortgagee.
HUD gives the partial settlement, amounting to ninty percent
of the unpaid principal balance, to the mortgagee. HUD may at this
time contact the mortgagor and advise its representatives that unless
the mortgage account is brought up to date, HUD will institute fore-
closure proceedings promptly after assignment. This procedure is
sometimes effective with the limited dividend mortgagor who may face
recapture of depreciation. The other course of action is to hold the
mortgage and work with the mortgagor toward reinstatement. HUD's
usual policy it to give the mortgagor an opportunity to reinstate the
mortgage if the full cooperation of the mortgagor can be anticipated
and if there actually exists a possibility of reinstatement within
a reasonable period of time. 1
HUD's status as mortgagee increases the intensity of its invol-
vement. More frequent inspections, and monitoring of the project are
undertaken. Once HUD takes a mortgagee under assignment, it remains
the mortgagee and holds the mortgage, irrespective of whether the mort-
gagor remains in default, or HUD forecloses and assigns the mortgage
for sale at public bid.
If HUD choses to reinstate the mortgage, there are four courses
that can be followed: 1) informal forbearance, 2) suspension or de-
ferment of reserve, 3) provisional work-out arrangements, and 4) per-
manent modification agreements. These four options are described in
detail below.
1) Informal forbearance is issued only when one or two mortgage
installments are unpaid and when early reinstatement of debt service
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terms is likely. Informal forbearance amounts to HUD's agreement
to forbear from taking legal action to enforce the terms of the mort-
gage.
2) A suspension or deferment of payments to the reserve for rep-
lacement is a mild measure designed to help those mortgagors whose
delinquency is small and for whom chances of reinstatement are good.
3) If a stronger form of relief is needed, a work-out agreement
can be implemented. It provides the maximum amount of financial
relief available to delinquent mortgagors without modification of the
terms of the existing mortgage. The greater amount of either net
cash on hand at the end of the month or the sum of the monthly service
charges (one-half percent of the outstanding mortgage balance) is paid
to HUD. Regular deposits to an escrow account for the payment of taxes,
and a fixed dollar amount agreed upon by the mortgagor and HUD are also
paid each month.
If there is a default under the work-out agreement, the property
is foreclosed by HUD. Work-out agreements are continued on a month-
to-month basis. The local HUD office makes a recommendation of a work-
out arrangement and the HUD central office makes the final decision.
4) From past performances, this relief measure usually fails to
bring all charges and payments up to date. A permanent modification
is used at this point to incorporate unpaid amounts into the mortgage
principal, extend the term, and permanently alter the payment schedule.
When a permanent modification fails, HUD forecloses to take title
of the property. Once it has acquired a project, HUD assumes the
responsibilities of the owner. It hires a managing agent to collect
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rents and oversees most of the project's day-to-day operations. HUD's
objective as an owner is not to hold the property permanently, however,
but to sell it as soon as possible for as high a price as it can obtain.
Conclusion
Mechanisms available to deal with default only postpone the date
on which, ultimately, a financially troubled development is foreclosed.
No major source of funds is available under HUD default servicing to
effectively deal with problems of financially troubled developments.
Remedies employed are either implemented too late or are inadequate to
really be able to turn developments around.
Deterioration in project finances increases since methods of
relief are only superficial cures and cannot produce adequate resources
for maintanence and management services.
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Chapter Four
THE MASSACHUSETTS HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY PROGRAM STRUCTURE
As a comparative analysis, in this Chapter we shall discuss the
program structure of the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency (MHFA)
to find how it's program provides certain safeguards against finan-
cially troubled housing. We will discuss what the MHFA does, why it
is able to be effective and what mechanism it has employed to guard
against foreclosure. The relative financial autonomy of the MHFA
and the consequent profit motivation to support itself has been
instrumental in its success. The combination of administrative in-
dependence and financial responsibility has given the MHFA a chance
to innovate and experiment, andihas required the agency to invest
carefully.
The Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency is an independent lending
institution created in 1966 by Chapter 708 of the Massachusetts General
Laws. Its mandate includes "financing the construction and rehabili-
tation of well planned, well designed housing projects to be made
available at low and moderate rentals for low income persons and families
and others."I In order to underwrite such projects, the State has
authorized the MHFA to sell short-term, tax exempt bonds to finance the
full term of the mortgage. The MHFA makes the first mortgage loans,
whose interest rates are two to four percent below conventional market
rates, to nonprofit and limited-dividend developers for the construction
of multi-family housing developments.
45
Different from federal low and moderate income housing at the time,
the MHFA was to provide housing for a limited number of low income fa-
milies in all-State funded housing. State subsidies through direct
appropriation and agency profits were to be used as one way of reaching
low income families.
The MHFA invites development proposals from prospective developers,
evaluates the proposals, and agrees to finance some of the proposed
developments. The incentives afforded to developers on State financed
housing are the same as those on HUD-insured subsidized housing. The
sale of tax benefits is the major source of profit to developers.
The MHFA arranges with HUD on an annual basis for a certain number
of 236 units for the use of the MHFA developers. Throughout this pro-
cess, the MHFA's primary role is that of a mortgage lender. It selects
and monitors its projects to assure the financial security of its
bondholders and to foster the social interests of the State.
Although the MHFA's bond-financed lending program is financially
assisted via Section 236 subsidies, there are other programs used by
the MHFA in addition to the basic 236 program. The State provided 13A
interest subsidies when HUD suspended the flow of Section 236 subsi-
dies. At present, the MHFA has combined 13A and 236 subsidies in its
housing developments. Massachusetts also implemented its own 707
leased-housing program, similar to the federal leased-housing program.
In addition, Massachusetts aggressively pursued federal 236 sub-
sidies, rent supplements, and leased-housing subsidies, because the
continued existence and effectiveness of the MHFA depends upon such
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funds.
The MHFA has a board which is appointed by the Governor of the
Commonwealth. Five of the members serve seven-year terms. By law,
the board must include persons experienced in mortgage banking, archi-
tecture or city or regional planning, and/or real estate transactions.
The Secretary of the Executive Office of Communities and Development
and the Commisioner of the Department of Corporations and Taxation
are members ex officio. Considering the nature of the financing
source, MHFA board members have regarded the fiscal soundness of each
individual project as the pre-eminent consideration.1
The MHFA is examined by independent State auditors, who investigate
programmatic as well as financial areas of the agency. These auditors,
however, have no enforcement authority.
Because the agency is not supported by tax revenues from the Com-
monwealth, it must support itself on fees charged to developers on
mortgage loans. Because the MHFA must raise funds from the bond market,
a high degree of security is required on the bonds and notes. In
addition to the State's "moral obligation", which provides some security,
MHFA projects must be financially solvent.
Effectiveness of the MHFA
The position the MHFA takes as a mortgagee makes it more actively
involved in the projects and thereby in a position to control many of
the risks. The controls on risk is the key to the success of the MHFA.*
The MHFA has played an active monitoring role. It has assumed
tasks normally associated with both the developer and the mortgage
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lender. The MHFA has played an important role in reviewing sites. It
has actively solicited proposals from developers and encouraged develop-
ments in particular parts of the State. It has been active also in de-
termining the unit distribution of its projects.
The independence with which the MHFA has been able to act has con-
tributed to its effectiveness. The MHFA must meet its administrative
and bad-debt expense through the generation of fees on the sale of their
notes and bonds. The fes generated allow reserves to be built up.
The MHFA does not have the same federal restriction on reviewing
housing proposals as does HUD. This has helped simplify the processing
of proposed developments. Criteria for approval of projects which are
administered by HUD in the case of federally-uninsured loans are left to
the discretion of the State agency; the MHFA determines the economic
feasibility of projects and project site selection.
One of the most significant differences between MHFA-assisted pro-
grams and those of HUD is that the MHFA is exempt from statutory maxi-
mum per unit mortgage limits imposed upon regular HUD programs. This
has made for greater flexibility and has allowed housing to be built in
high-cost areas.
The HUD administration of the 236 program has been criticized
because the processing of applications is cumbersome and time-consuming.
The MHFA administration has cut down on the amount of red tape and has
been able to process 236-assisted projects with reasonable speed. MHFA
processing time is about sixteen months, as compared to HUD's twenty-
four to thirty-six months.
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The lack of bureaucratization has been a major reason why the MHFA
has performed better than HUD. The MHFA has the advantage of compa-
ratively small size; its staff is composed of only fifty people. The
executive director directly supervises the four department heads: the
head of the mortgage department, which handles site, market and mort-
gage credit, the head of management, which handles rent-up, marketing
and project operations, the legal department head, which examines clo-
sing documents, and the head of the accounting department, which
handles billing and collection.
The narrow span of control has allowed decisions to be made on the
basis of frequent face-to-face communication between those who make and
those who implement policy, rather than necessitating the use of written
memoes; and this method of decision-making has contributed to the MHFA's
large production and effective management of the risks associated with
some of its projects. With only a few levels of controls, developers
are able to deal directly with those who have decision-making author-
ity. As an independent State agency, the MHFA is able to operate with
some administrative flexibility. Its staff has been exempt from such
limitations as civil service regulations, competitive bidding, and
direct State fiscal controls.
This lack of governmental restraints has permitted the MHFA to hire
young and talented employees, many of them under the age of thirty-five.
The agency has had an excellent opportunity to attract qualified pro-
fessionals because both its autonomy and its ability to generate fees
have allowed it to pay relatively high salaries.
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In avoiding some deficiencies of the 236 program administration,
the MHFA has made a particular effort to produce developments of high
quality and design. The opportunity to provide attractive and live-
able project design has been made available by the relatively low cost
of tax-exempt financing available to the MHFA. Interest rates charged
to projects by the MHFA have averaged one to two percentage points
less than those available through the ordinary HUD programs. In addi-
tion, the lack of a rigid mortgage amount per unit ceiling has allowed
the MHFA to increase mortgage amounts to the extent that resulting
increased costs can be offset by lower interest rates. The net effect
has been to emphasize varied dwelling layouts, architectural styles,
and amenities such as community and recreational facilities and day
care centers.
Emphasis on design is attributable to the MHFA's concern for
project economics; as the income of each project's occupants rises,
so does the rent. Consequently, unless a project offers particular
attractions for persons with the economic means to select their housing
freely, such people will leave the project as their economic position
improves, thus depriving the project and its neighborhood of valuable
social stability, as well as depriving the federal government of an
opportunity to reduce its subsidy burdens. There are also projects
located in low income or blighted areas where marketing problems exist,
even at low 236-subsidized rental rates. For these reasons the MHFA,
facing the need for financial self-sufficiency, has found good design
and attractive projects essential elements of their programs.
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One of the major attributes of the MHFA is its ability to tailor
existing programs to the needs of both special population groups and
particular kinds of urban areas. Housing for the elderly was a special
concern and the MHFA has been successful in fulfilling this need. The
MHFA has been an important source of housing for racial minority
groups. The MHFA has also been able to structure programs to local and
State needs. In addition, the agency has structured its processing
procedures in a manner that is efficient for its project volume and
average project size, rather than trying to use one procedure for all
scales of operation.
The amount of formalized rules and regulations in the MHFA is
relatively small. The MHFA has acted like a private lender in most of
its dealings. The few formal rules it does have primarily result from
requirements regarding subsidies made by HUD or the State Department
of Community Affairs. Both of these agencies set income limits on
leasing and rent supplement programs.
Overall, its flexibility has enabled the MHFA to be effective.
Its lack of rules has allowed it to negotiate with developers to
achieve maximal overall social input consistent with financial secu-
rity. The MHFA negotiates with developers and architects on design.
Requirements vary from development to development, depending upon what
is marketable and socially desirable.
Mechanisms against foreclosure
The problems of financial foreclosure of projects of the MHFA has
not occured. But it must be taken into account that relatively few
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MHFA projects have been in occupancy for very long. There are 588 pro-
blem dwelling units that are in default wirth debt service payments
three months behind.1  The principle explanation for the abscence of
foreclosure in MHFA projects, unlike projects with federal insurance,
is that the MHFA must self-insure its mortgages. As a self-insurer
of mortgages it holds, the MHFA expends much greater efforts to pre-
serve the economic health of the projects than an ordinary lender
might, who can pass problems on to the federal government when trouble
arises.
A HUD mortgagor receives both the 236 subsidy and the benefits of
HUD mortgage insurance, as we have already seen. The federal govern-
ment bears the risk of financial failure of any project and the duty
of operating or disposing of foreclosed properties. MHFA projects are
not insured by the federal government, therefore in the event of fore-
closure, the MHFA and the State are responsible.
The respective roles of HUD and the MHFA are different. As a
mortgagee, the MHFA must provide its own funds to projects, while as
an insurer, HUD insures the funds advanced by other mortgagees. The
two organizational roles are similar in that they assume ultimate risk,
should a project fail. If a project falls into financial difficulty,
the MHFA must either provide its own funds to keep the project afloat
or foreclose on the mortgage and sell it for whatever the market will
bear. From excess revenue generated ($7,777,000), the MHFA has bud-
geted a "contingency reserve" for potential loan losses (in the amount
of $4,300,000).P On a HUD-insured project, once default exists the
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mortgagee has the right to make a claim for insurance benefits. Should
mortgage payments continually be missed on a HUD-insured development,
HUD has to take over the mortgage and reimburse the mortgagee for loss.
The MHFA has used many different financial mechanisms to hold
interest costs down and protect its loans. It has set up a "funded
replacement reserve" as part of the mortgage to fund the rehabilitation
of buildings containing unexpected defects. A reserve for potential
loan losses has been provided. The MHFA has kept projects on bond
anticipation notes to allow for flexibility for mortgage increases and
to fund operating cost deficits for troubled projects. The use of
bond anticipation notes rolled over on an annual basis has allowed
notes to come on the market at four percent less net interest cost
than the long-term bonds, mainly due to their liquidity.9
Escrowing
The MHFA has taken steps to assure that tax shelter benefits that are
received by private owners of housing projects contribute to the fiscal
soundness of the projects. The tax benefits, as explained in Chapter
One are important incentives to private developers to participate in
subsidized housing projects. The capital contribution made by inves-
tors is left available for use in the project to meet unexpected
expenses, until such time as the MHFA has issued its Certificate of
Approval and acceptance of the completed project. The MHFA requires
developers to be responsible for meeting any operational deficits due
to increases in taxes or operational expenses. Security comes from a
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letter of credit for the first three years of operation to cover defi-
cits. This greater security provided to the development protects
investors against their most severe risk, that of recapture of depre-
ciation by the Internal Revenue Service, in the event of foreclosure.
Another requirement that the MHFA imposes regarding the sale of tax
shelter benefits by developers is the prohibition of use of the manage-
ment fee as collateral for payment of cash dividends. Even though cash
dividends constitute only a small fraction of the full return going to
investors, developers customarily have subordinated the management fee
to guarantee their payment. The result is insufficient funds available
to pay for competent management and additional pressure by management
to raise rents. The prohibition against subordination of the manage-
ment fee facilitates the creation of an adequate management budget,
especially for troubled projects.
The MHFA has also required developers to secure an agreement with
local assessing offices that tax assessments be based upon percentages
of gross rents. This tax formula makes rent increases less volatile.
If an agreement cannot be reached, the MHFA requires an escrow account
as a guarantee against the need for a rent increase based upon tax
increases. Since the major risks faced by investors are in the early
years of a project, these and other requirements add security to the
project and make it a sounder investment.
Conclusion
The experience of the MHFA,,gained by being intimately involved in
a larger number of developments of a similar type than any individual
54
developer, allows it to reduce normal development risks by antici-
pating and avoiding problems that might otherwise occur. MHFA
involvement in the development process insures that the development
finances serves the public goals of the agency. Its involvement
has reduced risk and has ensured that public interests will be
better served.
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Chapter Five
THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS UNDER
THE MASSACHUSETTS HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY PROGRAM
During the development/management process under the Massachusetts
Housing Finance Agency (MHFA), careful attention is given to the
long-term viability of developments. In this Chapter we will discuss
what rnmchanisms it employs to achieve long-term viability, starting
with the initial development of the site and development team review
stage, then proceding to design and construction, and then to manage-
ment. Finally, we will discuss proposed and already-implemented
methods for dealing with increased operating costs of multi-family
housing developments under the MHFA.
Site and Development Team Review
In an effort to ensure the financial success of a development,
the MHFA is particularly looking for sites that have the ability to
attract market-rent tenants. Such sites allow the MHFA to create
mixed-income housing. "Past experience of public-assisted housing
shows that the concentration of low income persons and families in
standard structures built with public subsidies does not eliminate
undesirable social conditions) " Through the mixed income approach,
the production of housing is both economically and socially successful.
The initial stage starts with preliminary submission of necessary
site information. The site inspector goes out to the site and reports
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on neighborhood facilities, physical characteristics, environmental
hazards, etc.
After the site inspection, the preliminary application is reviewed
by the entire MHFA staff from all departments together. The site
inspector presents his findings to all departmental personnel, who pro-
vide input and criticism on the development team's experience and com-
petence, on the site's ability to support market rental units, and on
the proposed unit mix for the site. Information about the site's
market area is compared with similar conventional multi-family housing
units built in the past five years. Examples of the kinds of infor-
mation reviewed are vacancy levels by bedroom type, the elimination of
housing in the area, low income need for housing in the area, popula-
tion trends, income levels, economic condition of the area, etc.2
Participation at this meeting of the entire staff allows many dif-
ferent sources of potential problems in the development/management
process to be pointed out. The staff itself obtains a broad under-
standing of the proposed development and the development team. The
meeting makes clearer what potential tradeoffs might allow for a viable
project at an early stage, and permits the MHFA to be aware of and deal
with all aspects of the development process.
At the staff meeting a decision is made as to whether to entertain
the application for the proposed project. Denial of an application
may result from an unsuitable site, development team, or both. The
proposed density and unit numbers may also be unacceptable. There is
an appeal process by which a resubmission of the preliminary applica-
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tion can be accepted if the deficiencies have been remedied. If the
development seems worth considering, the developer is introduced to the
mortgage officer who will have to approve the application from the
point of view of financial viability, and to the design and management
officer who will have to approve the application according to the cri-
teria established by his office.
Feasibility and Financing
In its review of financial feasibility, the MHFA performs certain
critical analyses on a proposed development to insure its viability.
An application for mortgage financing begins with full economic
information about the projects, including estimated income, operating
expenses, fixed expenses, and the estimated development cost of the
project. Usually the MHFA mortgage analyst works with the developer
on the application.
Feasibility focuses on operating costs first. Operating and
management budgets are reviewed carefully and are set at realistic
levels. Figures on operating costs are based on actual figures from
current MHFA developments in the area. The MHFA management staff are
involved in setting these figures, based on the most recent data avai-
lable. Operating costs vary, depending on the unit density mix, neigh-
borhood characteristics, and the type of development planned. The
projected operational figures take into account inflation to ensure
realistic operational expenses figures and long-term viability of the
project.
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Next, site acquisition costs are compared with those of other sites
that have been sold in the area recently. If there are unusual site
problems, the cost for remedying them is deducted from the price of the
site to keep this expenditure from having to be absorbed by the deve-
lopment. The MHFA uses its negotiation leverage with the developer to
obtain a site acquisition cost that the project can support.
The type of housing being developed, which attracts high and mid-
dle income tenants, gives the MHFA the ability to pay more to obtain
attractive sites and to lower the density of a development. This
higher site cost is able to be absorbed because the potential tenants
have the capacity to pay for it. HUD 236 developments on the other
hand are economically homogeneous, with low and moderate income te-
nants; their rental revenues cannot absorb a higher cost site.
The feasibility analysis includes a "built-in cushion" for higher
than expected interest rates. The lending rate charged to the de-
veloper is half a percentage point more than the MHFA's borrowing rate.
The MHFA uses a debt service constant that reflects the estimated
lending interest rate to the mortgagor. The debt service constant is
rounded up to the nearest quarter point as a contingency, in case the
MHFA's borrowing rate on the bond market should be higher than ex-
pected. This debt service constant, with the added contingency, is
used in the MHFA's calculation for the feasibility of the development.
If the actual bond financing comes in as estimated, money from the
contingency fund may be used as extra operating funds or to lower rents.
Currently under the Section 8 housing allowance program, the MHFA
provides another financial cushion for proposed developments by requi-
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ring all developments to be at maximum fair market levels set by HUD,
with excess revenue subsidies placed in operating budgets to insure
against possible future escalation of costs.E
Design and Construction
To ensure attractive and competitive developments, the MHFA
design and amenities levels are equal to or exceed conventional
apartment levels. Examples of these design and amenities levels
are seen in Figure 3.
During the design phase, if the MHFA feels that the architect
does not have the qualifications to design or construct quality hou-
sing, it may require the developer's architect to associate himself
with an architect possessing these qualifications. The MHFA has not
set any formal minimum standard on its design criteria, because it
feels that such a minimum would be used as maximums by architects.
This would restrict the quality of design. r
Designed into many MHFA developments is a high level of security,
which has helped many projects' long-run operations. Security screens
have been placed on first story windows on many developments, for
example. The requirement of a high level of security has been espe-
cially helpful to maintain livability and stability in developments
located in high crime areas.
The MHFA construction field inspectors participate actively during
the construction phase. There are weekly meetings with representatives
of the owner, architect, contractor, and any major subcontractors of
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the MHFA to go over the process of construction. The intensity of these
inspections enable small problems to be caught before they become major
ones. MHFA field inspectors have power over the disbursment of funds
and can hold up funds, demanding that deficiencies be remedied, before
allowing disbursment.
As mentioned previously, the MHFA requires the escrowing of syn-
dication proceeds until project completion. Thus, profits from syndi-
cation are available as security that can be drawn if there are serious
cost overruns or other financial problems. Because of this escrowing
developers are hesitant to agree on a construction budget which may be
unrealistically low, since resulting overruns mean possible elimination
of their profits. This profit-withholding has been an effective in-
centive to developers to meet their construction budgets.
Escrowing, however, does not preclude the MHFA from granting mort-
gage increases during construction to cover unexpected and justifiable
cost overruns. Part of the MHFA's success in avoiding financial fore-
closure during construction has been due to its ability to act quickly
and supply necessary funds to prevent delays. Since construction
financing is on short-term notes, mortgage increases can be easily
arranged. Decisions are made quickly when mortgage increases are asked
for.
MHFA staff have been involved in trying to resolve problems among
general contractors and subcontractors, and have served as mediators
in settling disputes. This has prevented possible delays from legal
proceedings, which may go forward if disputes are not settled quickly.
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For example, the MHFA has moved to insure disbursments of funds to sub-
contractors who have not been getting paid. This has kept them on the
job and averted possible walk-outs.
The MHFA's involvement has been with the committment to solve
problems; this problem oriented approach has been the basis of the
Agency's success.
Management
A crucial element in long-term project viability is the great
amount of effort expended by MHFA staff persons during the start-up
phase of a development. In the following section we will discuss the
extent of the MHFA's involvement in all aspects of the management
phase.
Marketing
During the tenant selection process, funds have been provided for
marketing to insure a large pool of possible tenants from which to
choose. HUD's 236 program, by comparison, does not provide for this
marketing expense. But this expense, provided for in the mortgage, is
important because it enables the project to attract tenants of varying
incomes. Enough funds are provided for a strong marketing effort to be
pursued. This has helped to facilitate quick rent-ups, attract mar-
ket-rate tenants, and to promote economic integration for a viable
project.
To insure quick rent-ups, conprehensive and community-wide adver-
tising is required two weeks before rent-up begins. A furnished apart-
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ment model is also required to have been set up at the site prior to
rent-up. 4
Tenant selection
The MHFA approves all tenants before their occupancy to insure
that economic integration is obtained. The MHFA reviews applicants
with the site management staff to be sure of eligibility and, more
importantly, that tenants can economically afford the rent levels of
their units. The need priorities and screening selection criteria
of tenants are shown in Figure 4 . The selection process is
conducted as equitably as possible, with criteria for selection being
made clear to both the applicants and the rental agency. Rights for
appeal of a decision are explained; an applicant's case can be heard
by an MHFA staff person. Throughout the process the MHFA has the
ultimate decision-making power.
Tenant-Management Relations
It has been the MHFA's policy to establish good communication with
tenants and its development's management staff. Prevention of aliena-
tion through good tenant-management relations has resulted in, in many
cases, obtaining good housing services with lower operating costs,
which is beneficial to all parties concerned.
Tenants are given a pre-occupancy orientation and a handbook to
educate them about the proper care of their apartments. The proper use
of appliances and facilities of the development, the rights of both the
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management and residents, and the rules and regulations of the complex
are explained.
Many existing lease agreements only define the obligations of
tenants and never those of landlords. Such agreements often are hard
to understand and reflect only the owners' interest, with little regard
to that of tenants. The MHFA "occupancy lease" is much more concerned
with the rights and obligations of both parties. For example, this
agreement requires the management to make necessary repairs within
seventy-two hours of a request to do so. It allows rent increases
only once a year and only after twelve months of occupancy by the
tenant. On the landlord's side, however, there is strict enforcement
of regulations that are set down, especially regarding the payment of
rents. In developments where the cushion for revenue loss is very
small, nonpayment of rents can easily put projects in a deficit posi-
tion. Management has ordered eviction of tenants for nonpayment of
rent fourteen days after it has been due. There is no right of appeal
of eviction, if there has been nonpayment of rent. However, this pro-
vision does not mean management may obtain rents no matter what the
quality of their management services. For, if the MHFA concludes that
the management has failed to remedy defects not caused by the resident
10
which are injurious to life, health, or safety, tenants may abate rents.
Because of clearly defined rules and responsibilities for tenants
and management, tenants have a strong incentive to complain to manage-
ment about maintenance problems, without fear of retaliatory eviction
or rent increases. Likewise, the management has a strong incentive to
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act on these problems quickly. Such actions maintain the quality of
a development and its desirabliity as a place to live, and thus pro-
tects the MHFA's investment.
To increase livability and to foster better communication among
tenants and management, social programs for tenants have been encou-
raged by the MHFA. These range from free summer concerts to weekly
beano and card parties. To assist tenants during certain hardships,
such as financial difficulties, management has made referrals of te-
nants to community agencies. This has been done to prevent involun-
tary termination of leases because of nonpayment of rent, and thus
has helped maintain the stability of the development.1
In general, the MHFA staff has taken an aggressive role in foste-
ring a strongly interdependent sense of rights and responsibilities
between tenants and landlords. The management staff actively visits
developments to make an assessment of the quality of maintenance and
to question tenants about how well their management is responding to
their needs. This "hands on" treatment is in contrast to HUD's policy,
in which written reports from the management agent are used as the
main instrument for management monitoring of projects.
In order to allow for better response to tenants' needs, on-site
management is given a high amount of autonomy and responsibility.
Expenditures of up to $ 500.00 for labor and/or materials in connection
with the maintenance of a project do not need the owner's approval. In
core city developments where maintenance needs are higher than normal,
more maintenance personnel are provided. Understaffed developments
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suffer from a higher than normal frequency of repair needs, which has
resulted in breakdowns in maintenance quality. Overworked maintenance
personnel have quit in frustration, which has resulted in high staff
turnover and has increased inefficiencies because of the training re-
quired for new replacements. Ineffectiveness due to understaffing,
then, has led to the deterioration in the quality of maintenance. Te-
nants'attitudes about the property are also affected. If the manage-
ment fails to provide adequate maintenance services, tenants are not
concerned with the upkeep of the buildings and are even encouraged to
deliberately vandalize them. Hiring the necessary personnel to provide
adequate maintenance ensures the livability and stability of the de-
velopment.
One of the major reasons why the MHFA has been able to meet expen-
ditures with revenues generated is the speed by which rent increases
are approved. The MHFA processes rent increase applications within
thirty days of their submission. Rent increases are evaluated accor-
ding to documented expenses from the previous two years and estimates
of the projected annual budget. Increases are granted for the purpose
of meeting projected expenses. HUD is slow to grant rent increases
and the amounts of increases are based on previously incurred expenses
only, and not on projected future costs. For the MHFA, however, rent
increases have given them the opportunity to review closely the finan-
cial position of a development and to find out if there may be a manage-
ment deficiency that has resulted in unnecessary expenditures. Some-
times an MHFA staff person has encouraged owners to ask for rent in-
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creases, even though they did not have this intention. The MHFA's quick
response in processing rent increase applications has prevented the de-
terioration of maintenance and other housing services.
The MHFA, on the one hand, is more aggressive than HUD in pursuing
tennats' grievances. On the other hand, it is also more aggressive in
supporting the landlords' legitimate demands and needs, such as timely
rent increases. What is critical to the MHFA's ability to perform to
both tenants and landlords is the Agency's nonbureaucratic capacity to
respond quickly to emerging landlord/tenant situations before they
balloon into crises.
Dealing with Increased Operating Costs
In this last section of the chapter we will examine the methods
proposed and currently used by the MHFA in dealing with increased opera-
ting costs, and why the MHFA has better capacity than HUD to absorb
them. We will look at potential options for dealing with such increases
and their ramifications as they relate to tenants.
Increases in operating costs, taxes and utilities, are critical
problems faced by the MHFA. The MHFA has been able to handle these pro-
blems in part because the presence of market income tenants provides
some latitude for rent increases, a latitude not found in totally subsi-
dized housing such as HUD's 236 developments. However, rents cannot be
raised indefinitely even with market tenants; and eventually the two
most serious elements in operating costs - utilities and taxes - must
be attacked.
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In 1974, when utilities and operating costs escalated from ori-
ginal estimates, the MHFA did an analysis of these increases. Their
findings show that utilities costs represented a major portion of
operational costs for developments. Among the twenty developments
investigated, per unit cost of utilities ranged from $ 288.00 to
$ 669.00 per unit per year. The cost analysis of the twenty develop-
ment budgets is shown in Figure 5
Energy costs are not the only budget item that has dramatically
increased. There has been a dramatic increase in payroll expenses
also, and, in some cases, in taxes. In most cases, however, the in-
creases in utility and fuel costs represent the largest dollar increase
in the expenses of the developments examined.*
The MHFA undertakes actions to better control developmental ex-
pense by allowing a fixed management fee only, instead of a fee based
on a percentage of gross rents. This has served two purposes: first,
management fees do not necessarily increase with an increase in utili-
ties rates when there is no extra management effort called for; second,
if management implements a program of lowering operating costs, it does
not suffer a reduction in its fee for initiating this savings. In
addition, a fixed structure prevents twenty percent of every rental
dollar from being used for increases in the management fee and for
increases in taxes, where these are based on a certain percentage of
gross rents. 15
In an effort to control utility costs, the MHFA has placed check
meters in existing developments where there have been high utility costs.
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Expenses for these check meters, $ 150.00 to $ 350.00 per unit, have
been funded through mortgage increases. When tenants review their lease
agreements, the amended agreement will have a maximum monthly kilowatt
usage included in the rent. Usage above that amount is charged to the
tenants by the management. Since 1975, new developments have been re-
quired to have check meters. Under a check meter system, the billing
continues to be master metered, but a check meter is tied into each
household line. Employees of the management agency record meter rea-
dings to judge whether there is substantial variation in utility usage
among tenants.
The check meter approach, it is hoped, will prevent tenant abuse
in the use of utilities. When a check meter system is used management
can educate high users in utility conservation measures, or a single
maximum usage may be included in the rent, with the tenant being billed
by the management for additional usage.
The check meter approach has the advantage of not automatically
throwing the whole burden of utility costs directly on tenants. It also
allows tenants who are careful to avoid utility surcharges. The disad-
vantage of this approach is that its administration may be complex to
undertake and difficult to enforce.
The MHFA had considered turning full responsibility for paying
utilities costs over to individual residents, with apartments being
separately metered, but decided that this would put an unfair burden on
some tenants. This is the typical means of metering of electricity in
conventional apartment housing. Such a pattern would substantially
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relieve the operating budgets of developments, but would also place the
burden of utility costs directly on tenants, regardless of their abili-
ty to pay. (HUD has allowed such a pass-through of utilities with
credit to the tenants in the form of reduced rents collected. Under the
1974 housing law it is possible for 236 developments to charge rent
without including utilities, but adding a utility allowance set down by
HUD that brings the rent down to not less than twenty percent of a
tenant's income.) I
Housing authorities in Massachusetts have operated the Rental
Assistance Program using a system in which tenants pay twenty percent of
their adjusted income plus utilities. According to the Cape Cod and
Island Tenants Council, this set-up can mean that tenants who are heating
with electricity can end up paying as much as four times their rent for
utility costs during the winter months. The Rental Assistance Program
experience demonstrates the disaster that can accompany tenants respon-
sibility for utility costs.11
Several housing authorities have operated with a pass-through
electricity system, with tenants having individual responsibility for
payment of utilities in conventional public housing. Utility costs
generally run between $ 25.00 and $ 35.00 per apartment (for two and
three bedroom units). For low income tenants, paying full utility costs
can mean an actual increase in rent of fifty percent or more, which can
put serious burdens on them. Currently utility companies also charge
security deposits to consumers that add to the financial burden of the
tenant.
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However, there are also positive benefits to low and moderate
income tenants as a result of passing-through utility costs. If the
rent is reduced when tenants take responsibility for the payment of
utility costs, there is a simultaneous reduction of operating costs
because of the reduction in the management fee. There is also a
reduction in taxes if there is a 121A tax agreement.
Recognizing that increases in utility costs are a problem, HUD
has redefined what is included in the basic rental charge. Under the
236 program, the 'basic rental charge and the fair market rental charge
may be determined on the basis of operating the project without the
payment of the cost of utility services used by such dwelling units. "
It also allows the rental of such units at less than twenty-five per-
cent of a tenant's income "as the Secretary's determination represents
a proportionate decrease for utility charges to be paid by such tenants,
but in no case shall such rental be lower than twenty percent of a
tenant's income. "
The 1974 Housing Act also allows HUD to pay an operating subsidy
for 236 developments in an amount which represents the increase in the
cost of utilities and taxes over and above the amount budgeted in the
original operating budget. This program has not yet been implemented.
Under many tax agreements, particularly under 121A agreements,
property taxes are based on a percentage of gross rents collected.
Since utilities costs are included in the rents, property taxes have
increased as utilities costs have increased. In finding methods to
lower taxes, the MHFA is currently attempting to develop a procedure by
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which utility costs are reflected as a separate charge to tenants and
taxes are charged on the basis of rents alone.
Another method by which the MHFA is trying to reduce utility costs
is energy conservation. Programs are being set up to train residents
in the use of equipment, to install timers, to cut wattage on lights,
etc. The MHFA is also presently installing into some of its develop-
ments computer-regulated heating systems. The computer control system
automatically regulates heat, depending on when it is needed. The re-
gulation is patterned to follow the living habits of tenants. In
laundry rooms, the MHFA has required timers on lights, which automati-
cally shut off after a fifteen minute period.
The MHFA has also obtained lower cost rates for utilities. This
has been accomplished by switching over to a single electric meter
system which allows projects to be billed at a lower "bulk rate" for
electricity. The MHFA has encouraged owners to actively bargin with
utility companies to obtain lower rates.
Another area where there is a wide variety of costs is in insurance.
The MHFA is exploring the possibility of purchasing blanket insurance
that would be available to all developments. A blanket insurance pre-
mium would give the MHFA enough leverage to reduce insurance cost,
particularly in hard-pressed inner-city developments where insurance
costs are high.
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Chapter Six
DEALING WITH FINANCIALLY TROUBLED PROJECTS UNDER THE MHFA
Early-Warning Signals in Problem Developments
Problems which have led to default may be difficult to detect.
Default occurs when obligations under the mortgage are not met with
adequately. Such failures can range from non-payment of debt to
management neglect. Detection of problems leading to default is used
as an "early-warning" system by the MHFA, so that proper action can
be taken before problems develop into major ones.
Developers have been reluctant to come forward to the MHFA to
indicate that problems exist in developments. Many developers try
to hide problems for fear of retaliation or even foreclosure by the
MHFA. This has resulted in unnecessary delays of disbursements from
funded replacement reserves to which developments were entitled all
along. It has also resulted in delays in applying necessary subsidies
to developments. Early detection of problems allows the MHFA to work
closely with developers to find effective solutions.1
A reason why problems are hidden is the identification of inte-
rest between the contractor and the management. Defects in construc-
tion must be remedied and the cost of such remedies must be absorbed
by the contractor. These costs reduce the builder's profit. Since
the builder and the management agent are one and the same, it is not
in this party's interest to report defects during early operation of
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a development when all the profits have yet to be collected.
An early warning sign of problems in projects under construction
is indicated by developers not drawing funds from their construction
accounts. This situation may indicate that work has stopped on the
site, due to disputes. Problems are also pointed out in reports from
MHFA construction field inspectors.
During operation of projects, early warning signs of trouble are
apparent in a lack of maintenance (e.g., unkempt public areas, unat-
tended to repairs, etc.), high levels of vacancies and rental arrear-
ages, dissatisfaction of residents, etc. These problems may indicate
that insufficient funds are being generated, and certain operating
expenses are not being paid. Such signs may lead to legal claims
from creditors or tax liens on the property. These problems can
threaten the operation of the development; utilities may be turned off
because of nonpayment, thereby making the development uninhabitable.
In an attempt to formulate a system to better flag problems in
developments, the MHFA requires tax payments to be directly contri-
buted to its office. Previously, the MHFA has required escrowing of
revenues for the purpose of paying property taxes, but payments have
not always been kept up by developers and insufficient funds have been
discovered at the time when taxes had to be paid. The MHFA is now
implementing a requirement which instructs developers to submit funds
monthly to the MHFA for the payment of these taxes. It is hoped that
this will enable the MHFA to more closely monitor the financial status
of its developments. Nonpayment to this tax reserve will permit im-
mediate investigation into a projects finances by the MHFA, and so
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catch problems at an early stage.
For most MHFA developments, 121A tax agreements are not signed and
are not legally binding. This has resulted in unpredictable tax in-
creases that existing rent revenues are unable to keep pace with. The
MHFA is attempting to cooperate with the Department of Corporation and
Taxation to make available tax figures on developments, in order to
enable the MHFA and the developers to make the necessary adjustments
in rents.
Yet sometimes the early-warning system is not sufficient to catch
a development before it gets into financial trouble. When such is the
case, that is, when a project falls into or nearly into default, the
MHFA has several options available to it. The MHFA has essentially
three alternative courses of action once a project falls into default:
1) do nothing, 2) foreclose, and 3) implement a workout. Each has a
set of consequences and ramifications discussed below.
MHFA Alternatives in Default Situations
1) Do nothing: this alternative ultimately lessens the develop-
ment's physical viability as well as its financial viability. It usu-
ally results in the next alternative, foreclosure.
2) Foreclosure: when this action is taken, the MHFA will probably
not be able to sell the development for the amount of mortgage indebted-
ness. If the project mortgage falls into default and the mortgage is
foreclosed, the investors loose their interests in the project and face
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a taxable gain on the foreclosure sale, because the unpaid balance of
the mortgage is deemed to be the amount for which the partnership sold
the property. This amount usually exceeds the partnership basis for
the property after construction losses and accelerated depreciation
have been taken into account. (In such a case, then, the investor has
a taxable gain on which income tax is due, as a result of a foreclosure
with no cash received and with the investors obliged to pay taxes.)
To date, the MHFA has not foreclosed on any of its workout negotiations.
Thus the MHFA chooses foreclosure only if there is no other productive
alternative.
There are, however, advantages to foreclosure. All project in-
debtedness to outside parties, except real estate taxes, is wiped out.
The MHFA is rid of an owner/manager that is unable to resolve the pro-
blems of the development, and obtains complete control over the project.
When the development is sold, a "problem development" becomes the res-
ponsibility of another party.
As the MHFA has not yet employed foreclosure, implementation of it
may add credibility to the MHFA's negotiation position. At present,
developers under an MHFA program are sceptical that the Agency will
ever foreclose, and threats of foreclosure have not been treated seri-
ously. Although an actual foreclosure would certainly alter this at-
titude, it would, of course, also affect the financial confidence of
bond holders in the MHFA. z
Foreclosure can adversely affect the MHFA's financial stability,
because the Agency must rely on the sale of bonds to finance futUre
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housing developments. Since the bonds are supported by payments on the
mortgages of the projects built with the proceeds, a series of fore-
closures on earlier mortgages impairs earlier bond issues and has a
serious effect on the saleability of future bonds.
There are drawbacks to foreclosure which make a workout situation
more desirable. Foreclosing is time-consuming and the time period for
transfer of the title can allow for deterioration of a development.
Prior to resale, a receiver must be appointed for the development to
insure that rental income is not diverted. In addition, legal and
other fees must be paid. The added deterioration tends to lower the
possible sales price on a foreclosure sale, thus increasing the MHFA's
losses.
Foreclosure sales have usually resulted in a sale price that is
less than the outstanding mortgage. HUD's foreclosure sales have ave-
raged fifty cents on the dollar. The difference between the out-
standing mortgage amount and the sale price would have to be made up
by MHFA loan reserves. These reserves could then dissipate rapidly.
Also, sale on the open market to a private owner would result in the
loss of subsidies and ultimate eviction of tenants who are unable to
pay higher rents. This could lead to political as well as social
problems.
Foreclosure should be used only when major deterioration which
threatens the security of the mortgage is occuring and when, at the
same time, the owner is not working in good faith with the MHFA to
resolve the situation.
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3) Workout: through a workout, the overall economic and possible
political and social ramafications of foreclosure can be averted. A
workout is the formulation of a financial plan to avert foreclosure and
continue operation under the existing mortgagor. Limited partner in-
vestors are concerned about keeping a subsidized project away from
foreclosure because of the serious tax consequences to them of fore-
closure. Thus there is a great financial incentive for all parties to
negotiate a workout.
MHFA Leverage in Workout Negotiations
The MHFA can take advantage of the situation in regard to fore-
closure and limited partner investors, as described above. The Agency
can demand certain changes and concessions from the limited partners.
Conditions under which the MHFA could agree to a workout arrangement
may include a change of general partners, and a cash contribution from
the partnership to fund deficits. Such moves have resulted in obtai-
ning new limited partners in the partnership to raise funds, in which
forty-nine percent of the interest can be transfered to new limited
partner investors, without the consequence of the transfer being de-
fined as a sale that may generate a tax liability. Thus the partner-
ship is kept alive without the tax problems of foreclosure, and the
funds from the new limited partners are used in the development to
offset deficits. If the nature of repairs is such that it does not
prolong the life of the development, the cash contribution for repairs
may be deducted as an expense in that year. This and other workout
factors will be discussed further later.
78
Another one of the tactics the MHFA has used to influence managers
and developers to work cooperatively to resolve problems is the threat
that the Agency will not do business with them in the future. At a
time when financial institutions are not lending money for multi-
family housing, the MHFA is virtually the "only game in town". Manage-
ment firms would like to cooperate as fully as possible, because they
do not want to be in the MHFA's bad graces.
Using its leverage, the MHFA has attempted to remove an undesi-
rable general partner from its developments. The establishment of a
procedure by which to remove a general partner or partners has been a
problem for the MHFA. In general, developers stubbornly resist a take-
over unless they can protect their tax and financial positions. A
general partner may not want to leave if he has a great deal to lose
in a development, either in terms of money invested, tax benefits,
equity that would be raised through refinancing, or undistributed in-
vestment capital from limited partners. But if an existing general
partner decides to drop out, he is relieved of all unsecured debts on
the property, for which the MHFA and new general partner or partners
must supply funds.
A new general partner would be desirous of replacing another in a
troubled development for the same reasons the original partner does
not want to drop out: to take advantage of syndication proceeds that
have yet to be disbursed and the possible equity the project may rep-
resent. Getting a general partner out and a new one in is a complex
and time-consuming political as well as legal process; but it may be a
critical element in rescuing a development from foreclosure. There
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are, however, a number of "workout elements" which the MHFA can employ
short of replacing a general partner. Those elements are critical to
an understanding of the range of options available to the MHFA when it
tries to orchestrate a successful workout package.
Workout Elements
There are a variety of forms of relief by which additional funds
may be made available to a troubled development. The MHFA can defer
payment of funds into the replacement reserve in order to allow other
expenses to be paid. Management fees can be lowered when it is felt
that those fees are rising excessively in response to other rising
costs. The payroll is vigilantly examined to see whether there are
excess personnel.
A mortgage increase due to increased capital costs is automati-
cally subsidized through the 236 interest subsidy existing on the
mortgage. A mortgage increase can eliminate operating deficits in a
"one-shot" manner. Funds from the mortgage can immediately eliminate,
for example, tax liens and pay bills, so that critical utility services
can continue uninterrupted. By funding through the mortgage funded
deficits, payments are spread over the life of the mortgage. The in-
crease in rents through this method is lower than if deficits were
directly made up out ofrent increases; thus this strategy is helpful to
developments with tenants who are already financially overburdened.
If more financial relief is needed, deferment of a part of the
debt service can be implemented. For devleopments that are on bond
anticipation notes, which are short-term financing instruments, interest
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may be deferred and accrued. This method of relief has been imple-
mented in new developments that have rent-up difficulties. It is
thought by the MHFA that all new developments might -be given a six
month debt service deferment period during initial rent-up. This
would enable developments to become financially stable and generate
sufficient revenues before debt service is paid. Interest that is
accrued during deferment would be included in the mortgage.
If a development is already on permanent financing, both inte-
rest and principal can be deferred. Deferment results in an in-
crease in debt service payments for the remainder of the mortgage
term. The following example gives a concrete illustration of the
way in which the MHFA structures a workout situation in a particular
troubled development.
Workout Example
Projects in central city areas have been a problem for the MHFA.
Scattered rehabilitation developments in Boston's Roxbury area have
experienced higher than average operational costs. And because these
developments are scattered, it has been more costly to manage them.
In a particular development in Roxbury, there have been problems
with tenant selection. The development initially experienced im-
proper tenant selection, which has resulted in a too high concentra-
tion of low income families. Unqualified tenants were chosen for
the moderate income units, for which they had insufficient financial
resources. This has resulted in high rent arrearages. Revenues
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were not adequate to allow proper maintenance, and this lack caused
vacancies to increase.C
This particular development has suffered a high amount of physi-
cal deterioration of public areas. The lack of open space in the
neighborhood and the limited living space within apartments have
caused hallways to become play areas, resulting in more wear and tear
on the property.
To help relieve some of the financial pressures on this develop-
ment, electrical heating systems, which have worked inefficiently and
are expensive to run, will be replaced by a gas system that will re-
sult in lower fuel bills. A mortgage increase of $ 12,000 per apart-
ment has been allocated. Eight thousand dollars will be spent for
physical improvements such as roofing, security windows, intercoms,
and the new heating system. The remainder will be used for unpaid
debt service. Rent supplement subsidies will be added to support the
mortgage increase.r
Also, the existing general partners will be replaced. The new
replacement has extensive holdings in the area, and has an in-house
management and maintenance staff to service the development. He will
be able to consolidate and better manage the development efficiently,
which should lead to reduced operational costs.
The MHFA is assisting the new general partner in negotiating with
the Boston Redevelopment Agency and the Office of Mayor Kevin White to
supply necessary infrastructure improvements in the neighborhood. The
MHFA is negotiating the release for rehabilitation of abandoned buil-
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dings next to the development, held by the City. Vacant lots owned by
the City are being sought to provide necessary parking facilities and
open space, to relieve congestion and to improve the neighborhood's
liveability.
As we see above, the MHFA has taken a very active role in the work-
out process. It has also taken the leadership role in influencing other
city agencies to commit resources to neighborhoods where MHFA develop-
ments are located.
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Chapter Seven
WORKOUTS: FINANCIAL AND LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS
In an attempt to find ways to deal with default more effectively
and to avert foreclosure, we will discuss in this chapter financial
mechanisms and existing tax laws as they pertain to a workout solu-
tion. A workout is the formulation or development of a financial
plan between the mortgagee and the mortgagor whereby foreclosure is
averted. The mortgage loan is put on a workout basis, in which bor-
rowers are given additional time and opportunity to work out of their
financial difficulties and repay the outstanding debts as the workout
program, imposed with the consent and cooperation of the borrowers,
permits. Through the workout option provided by the MHFA or HUD,
both the lender and the defaulting borrower evaluate the economic
viability and operational cash flow potential of the property to de-
termine a financial plan so that the mortgage of a property can be
reinstated. The financial plan may include the addition of capital
from the development's investors to make improvements necessitated by
defered maintenance, etc. Raising capital for improvements is a com-
plex process involving a variety of trade-offs - financial and legal.
The process of negotiating a workout must be examined ,in light of the
following elements: 1) partnership format, 2) tax consequences to
investors upon foreclosure, 3) limited partner participation in the
workout, 4) forbearance and its tax implications, and 5) repairs and
their tax consequences.
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Partnership Format
Some partnership agreements provide for the forced withdrawal
of a general partner and replacement by a new general partner if
certain conditions are not met by the original general partner. But
usually the general partner, often the sponsor or packager, has con-
siderable leverage over the investors by virtue of his position as
both legal and actual manager of the partnership's affairs. Even
though the partnership agreement may provide the investors with the
power to oust the general partner, without complex negotiation it
may be extremely difficult for the investors to force the general
partner to withdraw. Replacement of general partners is not a simple
matter. And resistance to removal can delay the implementation of
a workout plan.
General Partner's Liabilities
The stated obligation of general partners to insure viability of
a project may or may not be honored. To insure the viability of a project
the general partner often agrees to fund certain deficits of the
project for a period of time. In other cases, the limited partner
investor's capital contribution is staggered over several years during
operation to insure that a project remains free from default. But there
are also cases in which a syndicator and a builder are general partners
and are in serious financial difficulties, and may not be in a position
or may not be willing to pay these deficits.
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It should be noted that there are limits to the liability of
the general partner. There are provisions within the partnership agree-
ment that indemnify general partners from liabilities for any act
performed by themselves that is within the scope of the agreement,
except for acts of malfeasance, gross negligence, or misrepresentation.
Since the general partners are in full authority and control of
projects, it is difficult to enforce the legitimate claims of the
limited partners. Even though the standard agreement has provisions
for the removal of a general partner, enforcement is difficult. Thus,
when a project is in financial trouble that may lead to foreclosure and
limited partner investors want to make general partners live up to
their obligations (that is, pay project deficits, improve management
services); the limited partners must consider three things: 1) the
general partners have full management authority, 2) there will be
significant costs for litigation of all claims againstgeneral partners,
and 3) if the investors lose and the project is foreclosed, their tax
liability may be substantial.
A close analysis of the above factors may provide insights into
the investors' action or failure to act with respect to a workout.
Because it is so difficult for limited partner investors to enforce
claims against general partners, it is equally difficult for them to
force general partners into planning and carrying out a workout, or
to avoid foreclosure. However, claims against general partners are of
value to HUD or the MHFA only if the limited partners are able to get
cash from the general partners and continue their interest in the pro-
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ject; and the general partners are willing to use some of the money to
revitalize the project.
Tax Consequences to Investors upon Foreclosure
Investors in Section 236 limited dividend projects view their
investments in terms of cash benefits derived from income tax savings,
rather than benefits from the six percent return on equity from opera-
tional cash flow, or the mortgage refinancing potential after twenty
years. A financially troubled development that is foreclosed becomes
a potential income tax liability for the investors and makes for a loss
of future tax benefits. Because of these adverse effects from fore-
closure, investors have great motivation to participate in a workout.
The difference in price among 236 projects is important in evalu-
ating the investors' tax and financial position in relation to fore-
closure. The greater the cash investment as a proportion of the mort-
gage, the greater the likelihood of a tax liability if foreclosure
takes place during the early years of operation. The less the investors
paid to acquire the project, the shorter the period of operation re-
quired for him to break even before foreclosure occurs.4~
In most situations, a syndication sells ninty-five percent or more
of the tax shelter to limited partner investors by the twentieth year
of project operation. Toward the last two to five years of the twenty
year period, the project's mortgage amortization exceeds available de-
preciation deductions, and thus becomes a tax liability. However, de-
velopers with an optimistic view of potential sale can retain up to
87
fifty percent of the proceeds from a sale; or the developers can retain
up to fifty percent of the proceeds from refinancing after twenty years
of project operation; or developers can also retain a lion's share of
any cash flow after a given number of years.&
The tax consequences of foreclosure to a hypothetical investor who
owns a percentage interest in a limited partnership are dependent on
1) the income tax bracket of the investor, 2) the time when foreclosure
occured, 3) the project type (i.e., rehab vs. new construction), 4) the
amount of total investment, and 5) the amount of depreciation taken by
the investor.
In Figures 6 and 7 , two hypothetical projects with mortgages of
$1,350,000 and $3,150,000, respectively, are operated for different
lengths of time before foreclosure takes place. Figures and show
the financial tax liability which results upon foreclosure at years
two, five, and eight of operation, for investors with twelve, fifteen,
and eighteen percent of the mortgage as their capital investments.
The consequences for different investors are shown for those in fifty,
sixty, and seventy percent tax brackets.2
It is safe to assume that the more the investors have to lose from
a foreclosure, the harder they will try to avoid it. Even though inves-
tors have received prior tax benefits, which may have effectively re-
turned their investments, they still want to avoid foreclosure because
of the impending tax burden.
The longer the project has operated, the greater is the tax bur-
den of foreclosure. The tax burden upon foreclosure after five years
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of operation is twice that produced after only two years of project
operation (see Figure 6). The tax burden upon foreclosure increases
through the eighth year. After the eighth year of operation and on-
ward, the tax burden increases are not materially greater.
On the other hand, the longer the project operates before fore-
closure, the greater the gain to investors from tax shelters derived
from depreciation deductions. At the same time, the longer a project
has been operating before foreclosure or sale, the larger becomes
the proportion of the gain that is taxed at lower capital gains rates;
while the smaller becomes the proportion of the gain that is taxed at
higher income tax rates.
The tax bracket of investors is the significant factor in a con-
sideration of the effects of foreclosure. Figure indicates that
investors in the seventy percent tax bracket who invest in a project
for five years are close to breaking even after including the tax bur-
den of foreclosure; and after eight years these investors make a pro-
fit after foreclosure. Investors in the fifty percent tax bracket,
however, are still in a substantial loss position upon foreclosure
after eight years of project operation.t
The tax liability resulting from a foreclosure is an important
incentive to investors to justify putting additional cash into a pro-
ject. The contribution of cash may be the necessary condition to
produce a workout arrangement that allows the project to continue to
operate for a period sufficient to permit investors to recoup their
original cash investments. The tax consequences of adding more part-
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ners is also a consideration. When more funds are needed to help a
financially troubled development, new capital is sought via the
admission of new investors in the partnership, or through capital
contributions from existing investors. It is important to consider
Section 708 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code concerning admission of
11
new investors. This Section provides that if fifty percent of the
interest in capital and profits is sold or exchanged in any twelve
consecutive months, the partnership will be deemed terminated. Ter-
mination of the original partnership would be interpreted by the IRS
as a sale and would result in a tax liability for the original in-
vestors. The "new" partnership would not be considered to be a
"first user" of the depreciable property acquired from the prior
partnership and could not compute depreciation under the accelerated
method. This result substantially reduces all major tax shelters
for the second partnership.
If, however, the new investors do not purchase their interests
from the original investors, but contribute capital to the partnership's
continuing operations, such contributions are not treated as a "sale
'5
or exchange" and the partnership is not considered terminated. There-
fore, the now-enlarged partnership continues to obtain tax benefits
on the basis of the accelerated form of depreciation. Thus, it is
critical to preserve the original partnership so that full tax benefits
can be obtained and additional capital from new investors can be
attracted.
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Limited Partners' Participation in Workouts
From our previous discussion we have seen that mortgage defaults
may be caused by the following:
-inadequate management,
-marketing problems,
-inflation-related problems,
-particular types of projects in particular locations
(e.g., central city rehab project involving several
non-contiguous buildings), and
-tenants' inability to pay rent, etc.
Whatever the reasons, it is unlikely that the limited partners under-
stand the operational problems encountered by the project, because of
the inactive role they play in development affairs. The inactive
role of limited partners prevents them from obtaining adequate infor-
mation to enable them to participate effectively in a workout plan.
Even though periodic financial reports and annual tax reports are
provided to investors by the general partners, to the extent that the
project has encountered financial difficulties, the information pro-
vided by the general partners is probably too out-dated to be of use
to the limited-partner investors in a workout formulation.
Obtaining financial information and other data on a defaulted
project, at the time of or just before default, is a major problem
for investors. If the workout is negotiated directly by the builder-
sponsor and the investor or underwriter, it is possible that the in-
vestors have ready access to project information. But in most cases,
it is highly unlikely that investors can rely on associates who ini-
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tially promoted the project to cooperate and affirmatively assist in
the workout. The reason is that this assistance may expose associ-
ates to possible securities law violations that could be claimed
against them by investors.I4
If a limited partnership is made up of geographically diversified
investors and their investments are likewise geographically diversi-
fied, it is difficult for investors to participate in a workout. Even
if the limited partner investors are organized and able to deal di-
rectly with creditors and the mortgagee in a workout situation, they
can legally be liable as general partners as a consequence of such
active participation. Limited partners are usually not allowed to
make decisions concerning the business of the partnership. Because
of their "limited" business authority, limited partners are only
liable for the amount of cash invested and are not personally respon-
sible for the debts of the partnership.
According to Article 7 of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act,
"a limited partner shall not become liable as a general partner unless,
in addition to the exercise of his rights and powers as a limited part-
ner, he takes part in the control of the business." In this event,
liability exists for payment of partnership debts, except in the case
of a non-recourse mortgage. These debts may be unpaid wages, supplies,
utility expenses, etc.
Assuming that the limited partners are able to overcome the above-
mentioned hurdle and are willing to take the initiative to negotiate
a workout, sufficient time must be allowed for investors to
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-organize,
-agree on who will represent the investors,
-get the existing general partner or partners to agree
to accept the investors' representative in the workout,
-figure out how much cash is required to make the project
viable,
-determine possible tax liabilities for each investor in
case the mortgage is foreclosed,
-determine the period needed to continue project operation
to recoup cash investments,
-find alternative management if management has been a
problem,
-and find a new general partner or new general partners to
join the partnership such that the original partnership
is preserved.
Because of all the problems and risk involved in investor-initiated
workouts, there must be adequate concessions to justify such action by
them. Forbearance may provide a necessary incentive to investors.
Forbearance
A mechanism whereby additional funds can be used to support finan-
cially troubled developments is forbearance. Through forbearance, a
portion of the mortgage payments is deferred. Some form of long-term
forbearance can allow developments to continue beyond the point where
default would otherwise occur. Forbearance of a portion of the mort-
gage payments allows for an indirect method of paying for increased
costs, and may be tried if existing rent revenues are unable to meet
expenditures. Foreclosure can then be avoided and the development con-
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tinued on its 236 subsidy, to the benefit of the low and moderate in-
come tenants residing there.1I
There may be tax benefits generated from forbearance which can
themselves generate additional investments by investors - cash that
can be used to help the development. In the following section, the
tax aspects of forbearance and certain legal restrictions which may
prevent benefits from being realized are discussed.
The Internal Revenue Service has said that "excess" tax deductions
produced by an investment having no profit potential are not allo-
wable. 1  Excess deductions are generally considered to be the amount
of annual tax deductions with respect to a property that exceeds the
sum of the annual income plus the amount of repayment of the mortgage
and required reserves.le If the economic effect of a long-term for-
bearance program is to virtually eliminate the possibility of current
or future income or increased equity through mortgage amortization,
the IRS may disallow the excess deductions. Another problem is that,
according to the IRS, capital contributed by investors in order to
defer mortgage payments may be looked upon as a new investment; and
therefore the original partnership is considered terminated. Thus,
by this line of reasoning, the new investment has been made without
the intention of receiving a profit, but merely for the purpose of
creating a tax shelter for the investors' other income. In this case,
all future excess depreciation deductions are disallowed. This IRS
policy discourages additional capital contributions as a condition
for forbearance.
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Possible Tax Benefits to Investors Through Forbearance
Forbearance for any period of time may produce additional tax
shelter benefits for a project. Interest that is based on a for-
bearance, but is added to the principal and is due at maturity, may
result in a tax shelter if taxable income or loss goes by the ac-
crual method of accounting.1 Deduction for accrued but deferred
interest is a possible incentive to investors, because it is similar
to a non-cash deduction that can shelter other income.
Investors in an accrual-basis partnership take into account the
possibility of increased deductions by virtue of the deferred in-
terest. According to existing Treasury regulations, "deferral of the
time of payment of an otherwise deductible item does not affect its
current allowability as a deduction by an accrual basis taxpayer.
But there may be a drawback in that accrual deduction may not be
allowed if there is no intent to pay the deferred interest in the
future.
In general, the rule appears to be that deductions for interest
may be accrued if, at the time the deductions were taken "it could
not have been categorically stated that the interest would not be
paid." Thus, so long as the workout agreement merely defers the
obligation to make interest payments, but specifically does provide
that all such deferred amounts will be payable on some fixed date,
then accrued interest may be deducted.
Even if the investors cannot be certain of permission to de-
duct for such accrued interest, they would consider the possibility
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of such a deduction as a major factor in a workout.
For the investors, the greatest benefit is generated when a for-
bearance policy is initiated as early as possible. For example, in
a fifteen percent investment situation, a seventy percent tax bracket
investor benefits $22,770 after two years, $21,115 after five years,
and only $16,642 after eight years of project operation. Tax bene-
fits are based on total benefits generated from the remainder of the
twenty year term through long-term forbearance (see Figure 7 ).
It is interesting to compare the status of the investors in the
case of a foreclosure, as shown in Figure 8 , with the benefits they
derive from staying with the project under a two-year or a lifetime
forbearance. A seventy percent tax bracket investor with fifteen
percent of the project mortgage would have, at foreclosure after two
years of project operation, an unrecovered investment of $5,935.
However, if the investor remains with the project (with a two year
forbearance), he realizes a net benefit of $22,770, for an "in pocket"
gain of $16,835. In the case of the lifetime forbearance policy, the
investors obtain greater benefits. The same seventy percent taxpayer
is enriched by $34,624. In almost every situation the investors
profit by staying with the project, and their benefits are proportional
to their tax brackets and the timing of the implementation of the
forbearance policy.
The most important component of the future losses in a forbearance
is the accrued interest on the unpaid portion of the mottgage.21 The
accrued interest has the same tax effects as tax deduction without cash
outlay.
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In the case of a short-term forbearance of two years, with the
project being held for twenty years, the denial of the deductibility
of accrued interest is not critical to the final result (see Figure 7).
However, it is a different matter for a project that receives a life-
time forbearance. In this situation, the deduction of accrued inte-
rest results in substantially greater net benefits to the investors.
Investors generally pay a higher price to purchase an interest
in a rehab project than they do for one newly constructed. The price
may range from eighteen to twenty-six percent of the mortgage. For
any tax bracket, investors recover less of their investments after
foreclosure of a rehab project than they do after foreclosure of
a newly constructed project (see Figure 9 ). However, because depre-
ciation deductions for rehab projects can be made over five years,
whereas deductions for new construction must be made over thirty to
thirty-five years, investors receive a greater return from rehab
construction. For investors, the contrast between the results of
foreclosure and forbearance is great. For example, an investor who
has a ten percent interest in a development'and is in a fifty percent
tax bracket, and who still has $ 527.00 (unrecovered) in the project
suffers a $16,533 loss with foreclosure, but gains $19,990 with a two
year forbearance and $27,287 with a lifetime forbearance (see Figure
10).
We can see that most investors would want to avoid foreclosure,
prefering the possible added tax benefits from a forbearance. If ad-
ditional funds are raised, they can be used as incentive fees to
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induce new management to oversee the project, which in turn would allow
this contribution to be a tax deductible expense. In the following
section, we will see how contributions from investors can be treated
as deductions when used for various purposes in the project.
Deductions for Repairs
The treatment of investor contributions and any other funds used
for repairs is an important consideration with respect to their tax
deductibility. There is greater attraction to investors if their
contributions to a project can be immediately deductible. Regarding
the deductibility of capital contributed for repairs, required
because of deferred maintenance or vandalism:
"...the cost of incidental repairs which neither
materially add to the value of the property nor
appreciably prolong its life, but keep it in an
ordinarily efficient operating condition, may be
deducted as an expense provided the cost of ac-
quistion or production or the gain or loss basis
of the taxpayer's plant and equipment is not
increased by the amount of such expenditures.
Repairs in the nature of replacements, to the
extent that they arrest deterioration and appre-
ciably prolong the life of the property, shall
be capitalized and depreciated."23..
To distinguish between what is considered a capital expenditure
and what is considered an expense item, we state the following:
"In determining whether an expenditure is a capital
one, or is chargeable against operating income, it
is necessary to bear in mind the purpose for which
the expenditure was made. To repair is to restore
to a sound state or to mend, while a replacement
connotes a substitution. A repair is an expendi-
ture for the purpose of keep-operating condition.
It does not add to the value of the property, nor
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does it appreciably prolong its life. It merely
keeps the property in an operating condition
over its probable useful life for the users for
which it was acquired. Expenditures for the pur-
pose are distinguishable from those for replace-
ments, alterations, improvements or additions
which prolong the life of the property, increase
its value, or make it adaptable to a different
use. The one is a maintenance charge, while the
other are additions to capital investment current
earnings.".3
There are various factors which are important in determining the
deductibility of repair costs for the buildings involved in workouts:
1) if repair expenditures are made solely for the sake of complying with
building code regulations, they are not considered to be deductible,
2) expenditures made as part of a plan to put a building in ordinary
operating condition (that is, to recondition, as opposed to keeping
it in good condition) are generally treated as deductible repairs.
From these trends it seems that major repair expenditures which
prolong the life of a building are not allowed to be deducted from
operating income as an expense. This inability to deduct repair
expenses is a disadvantage to investors, who want to obtain immediate
tax deductions for their contributions.
Conclusion
The use by HUD and the MHFA of tax leverage in a workout is a
major negotiation tool. To employ tax leverage, detailed information
from the investors as to the terms upon which the project was acquired,
statements as to the actual tax benefits derived to date, as well as
other related data (financial records, etc.) are required. It may be
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difficult to obtain such information and efforts to do so may result
in considerable controversy concerning privacy of personal finances.
HUD and the MHFA may only be able to make assumptions about the
investors' tax positions in their negotiations.
On of the key incentives for additional capital contributions
by investors is the added tax benefits realized through long-term
forbearance. Granting forbearance can be used by HUD, but can be
financially detrimental to the MHFA, which depends upon the repay-
ment of interest and principal from its outstanding mortgages to
pay the Agency's bond holders. Ultimately, understanding the tax
position of limited partner investors is a vital tool in workout
negotiations, negotiations which seek to obtain additional capital
for a development sorely in need of financial aid.
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Chapter Eight
MECHANISMS TO AVOID FORECLOSURE
In our previous discussion we analyzed the workout mechanism
that may be used to avert foreclosure. In this Chapter we will
discuss other possible mechanisms that could be used singly or in
combination to belp avoid foreclosure and to insure long-term pro-
ject viability. In the first half of this Chapter we will discuss
mechanisms that could be useful to both HUD and the MHFA. These
mechansims are mortgage writedown, additional subsidies, debt ser-
vice deferment during rent-up, and savings on construction costs.
In the second half of the Chapter we will discuss certain techni-
ques presently used by the MHFA which may be adopted by HUD to
improve their program. They are setting up reserves for develop-
ments and mortgage refinancing for repairs and upgrading. We shall
also discuss HUD's need to restructure its own agency organization
and the methods by which it implements housing programs.
Financial Alternatives Available to HUD and the MHFA
Mortgage writedowns: for financially troubled developments that
have not been foreclosed, the writedown of existing mortgages would
allow continued operation of these properties as housing for low in-
come families. A writedown is the reduction of a debt in order to
bring it into agreement with its present "going" value. Because of
101
the potential project deterioration and hardships faced by tenants dur-
ing and after the sale, a writedown could be necessary to avert these
consequences.
A foreclosure sale usually would not generate enough funds to pay
the total balance of the outstanding debt and a loss would be incurred.
HUD or the MHFA would gain little on a sale as compared with a reduc-
tion of the mortgage. With either one, the loss is about the same.
But through the writedown, the ramifications of foreclosure are avoided
and future interest subsidy payments are reduced.
The writing down of existing mortgages by HUD may be politically
undesirable because of the increase in cost to the federal government.
This problem can be overcome if relief can be applied in the form of
a forbearance. Debt would still be outstanding but debt service would
not be paid. This form of relief has been discussed in chapter seven.
For the MHFA, this writedown strategy is possible only if re-
serves plus other funding sources are available to support this mea-
sure. Since the MHFA must be financially responsible to its bond-
holders, any loss due to the writedown of a mortgage must be made up
by other funds. Presently a loan loss reserve of over four million
dollars has been established, but this amount is not sufficient to aid
a large number of units. Co-insurance with the federal government may
provide the necessary resources to support writedowns. Without co-
insurance the MHFA,is unable to use writedowns, or it jeopardizes its
financing capacity.
The writedown, when used instead of foreclosure, could relieve
both HUD and the MHFA of potential ownership and management responsi-
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bilities. The writedown of the mortgage could be to a level which the
project's income can support.
The tax consequences to the mortgagor of the writedown of a mort-
gage depend on many circumstances. When there is a cancellation,
forgivness, or reduction of mortgage indebtedness, as in a writedown,
and where the property is not lost through foreclosure, or voluntary
conveyance, or abandonment; Section 61(a)(12) of the Internal Revenue
Code provides that the amount of debt which no longer need be paid
constitutes ordinary (taxable) income to the debtor.I-
But there are exceptions to the general statutory rule that pro-
vide significant tax relief in appropriate circumstances: there is no
taxable income created where the mortgagor is not personally liable
for the debt. In this case, the debt reduction is treated as reduc-
tion in the basis. Since mortgages under HUD and the MHFA are non-
recourse instruments, the mortgagors are not liable for mortgage debts
and writedowns do not result in taxable income to the mortgagors.
Additional subsidies: currently Section 236 subsidies only reduce
debt service charges. From the very start, the 236 program failed to
incorporate provisions for operating subsidies which, it is clear, in
periods of inflation become a vital component of project planning.
Initially it was hoped that a debt service subsidy would enable the
government to make housing affordable to low and moderate income fami-
lies. The Section 236 subsidy is fixed and has no provisions for in-
creased operating costs, or other economic factors which have made
decent multi-family housing out of the economic reach of these families.
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If Section 236 developments are allowed to switch to new Section
8 housing allowance subsidies, these developments will be affordable
to low and moderate income families. Section 8 outlines a straight-
forward subsidy program that will serve both low and moderate income
families. The difference between what a tenant can afford to pay
(fifteen to twenty-five percent of his income) and the fair market
rent for the unit will be paid by HUD. But presently Section 8 funds
are encumbered by restrictions against their use as a means of refi-
nancing subsidized housing projects or as a means of providing opera-
ting subsidies.*' HUD could lift these restrictions or develop a
subsidy program to cover project operating costs. Annual subsidies
can be implemented and would be desirable from both policy and budge-
tary points of view, because they can be modified every year in
response to the needs of developments. This provision of subsidies
would be beneficial to both the MHFA and HUD.
Debt service deferment during rent-up: one mechanism available to
HUD which is currently being reviewed by the MHFA is a six month grace
period, during which debt service does not have to be paid to allow
for rent-up. Also, HUD would benefit from this mechanism if it were
applicable to multi-family projects that have troublesome rent-up
periods and/or during periods when developments are unable to generate
enough revenues. Revenues received during this period would be used
to pay expenses. The unpaid debt service would be capitalized in the
mortgage.
Cost savings in construction: currently under both the MHFA and
HUD programs, a builder's profit is calculated on the basis of total
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building costs. The more costly the building is, the more profit the
builder gets. The practice of sharing construction savings with
owners has been common in the conventional construction industry. Per-
mitting contractors to share in any savings they might realize would
encourage them to reduce construction costs as much as possible. Sa-
vings could be realized without sacrificing the quality of the develop-
ment. Construction cost savings would help lower building costs for
both HUD and the MHFA.
Program Improvements Available to HUD
Now we will discuss mechanisms presently used by the MHFA that
can be adopted by HUD to improve that Agency's response and effective-
ness.
Reserves: for HUD developments, funded replacement reserves could
be set up (as exist now in the MHFA) in order to fund repairs. This
would prevent deterioration of developments and cover the cost of un-
expected maintenance.
Escrow of builder/sponsor profit risk allowance: HUD could escrow
the BSPRA, as the MHFA does with the developer's fee (the two are dif-
ferent terms for the same thing). The BSPRA could be paid out over a
three year period to insure successful operation of developments.
Whatever deficits occur during this period Ccuddbe paid by the BSPRA.
The BSPRA could vary according to the size and risk of the project (it
is now a flat ten percent for developments, and has no direct relation-
ship to the amount of effort required from the developer), and be
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based on a sliding scale with respect to project size and the risk
involved.
Funds for repairs and upgrading: currently many financially
troubled developments are in a chronic state of disrepair. Before
any viable financial/management scheme can be effectively imple-
mented, the needed repairs must be made. Certain capital expendi-
tures must be made to produce reductions in maintenance and repair
expenditures.
Where possible, there could be mixed income housing (HUD does
not now have this under its 236 program). Through economic inte-
gration, better economic stability is achieved in the developments
because of the greater elasticity of the tenants as a group to
absorb increased costs. Inclusion of higher income tenants would
help support mortgage increases for the funding of necessary re-
pairs and upgrading of the development.
HUD could provide amenities which would upgrade developments
and enable them to compete on the conventional market. These im-
provements would help maintain project stability with low income
tenants, who often move out of housing developments when their in-
comes increase and they find that their housing dollar is better
spent for conventional market units. Upgrading would make develop-
ments more desirable places to live and keep these tenants from
moving out.
Mixed income developments: a possible roadblock to be faced by
a developer in conversion to a mixed income development is reluc-
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tance of low income tenants to move out to make way for middle and up-
per income tenants. This situation may be remedied through natural
attrition in the development, but this can be a slow process.
Some complications for HUD of conversion to mixed income housing
may arise out of a development's present location, which may prevent
attraction of middle -upper income families no matter what amenities
are provided. Additionally, the development's reputation may be a
marketing handicap. Furthermore, the physical design configurations
may prevent amenities from being added. New project construction on
an adjacent site may allow for upgrading by extension of amenities
from the new project to the already-existing housing development.
Combined housing developments enable a larger area to be turned into
a micro-environment, and possibly can neutralize the impact of ad-
verse surroundings.
The mixed income approach has been the basic policy of the MHFA
and has been implemented successfully throughout their developments.
HUD can benefit from this approach; having mixed income housing could
help insure the stability of project finances.
HUD and an increase in responsiveness: one of the reasons for
the MHFA's lack of housing defaults is the intensity of monitoring and
servicing that Agency provides to its developments. HUD area offices
have played an almost passive role, on the other hand, due to inflexi-
bility and/or inability to make decisions. Many decisions must be
channeled to regional or even to Washington offices before action may
be taken. This does not encourage fast or direct dealing with problems.
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HUD could give more direct responsibilities to area offices.
They could be allowed to determine the types of projects that should
go in a particular area. HUD could become like the MHFA with respect
to responsibility and flexibility.
Also, processing housing proposals has been cumbersome because
they must be accepted by both the regional and the Washington HUD
offices. One-stop processing could be provided if approval responsi-
bility were more localized. Local responsibility would shorten pro-
cessing time, which would enable the project to be built before in-
flation renders the development unfeasible.
Rent increases: with additional responsibilities given to HUD
area offices, rent increases could be granted more quickly. Applica-
tions for increases could then be processed within a thirty day period.
Increases could be based on projected expenses and not on past expen-
ses, in order to have enough funds for adequate housing services.
Currently rent increases are based on past expenses, with the result
that revenues do not meet expenses.
Design flexibility: detailed governmental design reviews have not
allowed for flexibility in design of HUD projects. The MHFA has been
flexible with architects and has held them responsible for specific
design decisions. The MHFA has concerned itself with the major cri-
terion of producing housing of a design quality that is equal to or
better than conventional apartments. If HUD is going to produce well-
designed and architecturally sound projects, it must be willing to
work with architects in a fashion that more closely approximates that
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which is typical for conventionally financed projects.
HUD and provision of financing: by raising money through the bond
market, the MHFA has been able to lend at lower rates than conventional
lending institutions. Under HUD's program, money is obtained through
conventional lending institutions at higher interest rates. The sub-
sidy support required to lower mortgage interest rates to one percent
under conventional financing is greater than that required under MHFA
financing. HUD could realize savings on interest charges if it could
provide its own funds for projects through federal financing. (The
mortgage rates received would be equal to or less than MHFA rates.)
The lower rates obtained by federal financing would be due to the high
quality of security on these notes. The drawback, of course, is that
the mortgage financing would be included in the federal budget and
this could lead to reluctance on the part of Congress to back HUD
projects. Such reluctance could be overcome if Congress would give
the power to borrow funds to the Federal National Mortgage Association
(FNMA), the Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA), or to
a new financing entity - power backed by the full faith and credit of
the federal government. If HUD could raise funds through the FNMA/
GNMA, then project mortgages would not add to the federal budget.
Conclusion
A combination of financial mechanisms to avoid foreclosure and
better control over certain expenses can be used to reinforce the fi-
nancial foundation of devleopments. These mechanisms and controls,
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used alone, cannot insure financial viability. Active participation,
flexibility in program structure, and direct responsibility on the part
of HUD and the MHFA for the development/management process are all vital
to the success of subsidized housing developments.
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Chapter Nine
CHANGE OF OWNERSHIP IN HUD DEVELOPMENTS
Change of ownership can be seen as a drastic, and yet unique,
means of "boiling out" a project; that is, of keeping the project
within the reach of low income families. Ownership forms that will
be discussed are non-profit conversion to limited dividend status,
HUD sales to local housing authorities, and encouragement of the
IRS "rollover" provision for tenant ownership. A model of tenant
ownership, currently being proposed jointly by Greater Boston Com-
munity Development, Inc. and Community Training Dynamics, Inc.,
will be examined in depth.
Non-Profit Conversion to Limited Divident Status
A non-profit development that has been foreclosed or is in
default can be sold and converted to a limited dividend development,
and the resulting cash can be invested for the benefit of the develop-
ment.
Conversion to a limited dividend development produces attractive
tax benefits through depreciation. The depreciable base of the
development is the amount of the unpaid mortgage, plus any cash in-
vested from the limited partner investors. Since conversion probably
results in a second-user status, only 125 percent of straight-line
depreciation may be taken. Still, the tax benefit generated is at-
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tractive if there is a guarantee that there will be no foreclosure on
the mortgage for a predetermined period, such that all investors
recoup at least the amount of their original investments. Also, for-
bearance of some portion of the mortgage debt service, which results
in the accrual of deferred interest, might provide an additional tax
attraction to investors.I
The possible tax benefits to an investor of a non-profit 236 pro-
ject which is reconstituted as a limited dividend 236 project is shown
in Figure 11 . This Figure shows benefits that are available to an
investor owning one-hundred percent of the project. The combination
of lifelong forbearance and depreciation results in an attractive
benefit to investors.
HUD Sale to Local Housing Authorities
The sale of HUD projects to local housing authorities would at
least leave housing developments available to low income tenants. HUD
236 developments are packaged housing resources that can be owned and
managed by local housing authorities immediately. Of course, for this
to happen, HUD must be willing to allocate to local authorities the
necessary public housing subsidies and funds for improvement before
the transfers can be made. Sale to local housing authorities would
relieve HUD of management/ownership responsibility and leave fore-
closed housing resources available to low income families. Families
who have incomes above public housing levels but cannot afford market
rents are not benefited by such sales.
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Encouragement of Rollover Provision
The rollover provision under the IRS tax code allows sale to
tenants without the consequence of depreciation recapture, as long as
proceeds from the sale are reinvested in another subsidized project.
The rollover provision has not been widely used because financial
benefits allowed to investors are not attractive enough to facilitate
these transfer sales. Another drawback to such sales is the unavaila-
bility of qualified tenant organizations to sell to.
Currently, since many HUD developments face foreclosure, inves-
tors may be willing to consider the use of the rollover provision;
but education of tenants towards ownership must be carried out by
owners if responsible management/ownership is to be obtained. Funds
could be provided for planning and tenant takeover of ownership.
Tenants could be taught that as owners they would have the benefit of
tax deductions for interest and for tax payments, in addition to the
possibility of building up equity in the project.
To date, the IRS rollover provision has been used only as an
escape, to permit sale of financially troubled developments to tenants.
Incentives could be provided for sponsors to transfer control of fi-
nancially healthy developments to project occupants. If developments
are in good repair and are financially sound, and sponsors can prepare
tenants for ownership transfer, then HUD could give sponsors a fee for
their efforts towards this transfer.
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Tenant Ownership Model
For developments that have been foreclosed or are in the process
of being foreclosed, conversion to cooperative or tenant owned develop-
ments may bring more responsible management to them. Two non-profit
corporations have submitted a joint proposal to develop a pilot pro-
gram in a Roxbury project which is designed to relieve HUD-Boston of
management and ownership responsibilities for foreclosed properties,
and to secure tenant owned housing on a long-term basis.
Greater Boston Community Development, Inc. (GBCD), a non-profit
housing development and management consulting firm, and Community
Training Dynamics, Inc. (CTD), a non-profit minority development and
construction training organization, are negotiating a purchase option
with HUD that would permit CTD and project residents to acquire owner-
ship at the end of a two year period. GBCD would give technical
assistance during the transfer.
According to the GBCD/CTD model, its purpose would be to increase
residents' involvement and control over project operations. The pro-
posal asks that HUD ultimately transfer multi-family properties to
tenant cooperatives or community groups.
Supporters of this model hope that greater resident involvement
in the management and ownership of subsidized housing will help resolve
such major physical, social, and financial problems as vandalism, lack
of reasonable security for tenants, and polarization of management and
tenants.
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This model would deal not only with the day to day operation of
the buildings, but also with a wide range of tenant needs and social
services. (This proposal provides for voluntary interaction between
various social agencies and residents who want to take advantage of
their services.)
The transfer of distressed properties to tenant cooperatives or
community groups would shift the control and responsibility for these
housing projects to the people they were meant to benefit. In fi-
nancially troubled developments, increased maintenance and utility
costs could be lowered by greater tenant involvement. Savings could
be accomplished by tenants taking personal responsibility for main-
tenance repairs and conserving energy to keep utility costs down. If
tenants receive information, they could learn how rents are related
to operating costs and how their efforts could lower these costs.
With buildings under tenant ownership, hopefully tenants would be
willing to expend energy to make developments work, since it would be
in their interest to do so.
The proposal provides for testing of the economic, physical, and
social feasibility of transfer of ownership; and requires that the
transfer of property be accomplished only when proper knowledge and
skills for responsible property ownership have been acquired. Bene-
fits of ownership would be explained to existing tenants by CTD/GBCD,
and tenant participation in the CTD/GBCD program would be solicited.
One benefit that could be emphasized would be that under tenant owner-
ship, rent levels could be kept affordable partly due to a relatively
low sale price from HUD.
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Tenant ownership would also benefit the wider community (in this
case, Roxbury); the process of project default, foreclosure, deteri-
oration, eviction and abandonment by residents, and ultimate demoli-
tion of buildings only blights the neighborhood and eliminates housing
resources for low income families. Tenant ownership would not only
break into this chain of events, it would better insure continuing
project operation and conservation of housing resources.
The CTD/GBCD would provide two years of interim management ser-
vices for these buildings before the transfer. This would be a time
for tenants to learn about and get involved in management responsi-
bilities and the advantages of ownership. The CTD/GBCD would struc-
ture a management system that would be useful whether or not the
residents assumed ownership at the end of the two years, and that
would show residents how to improve their living environment.5
There has been a problem of attitude toward ownership on the part
of residents, because they perceive that their existing neighborhood
and living environment is unsafe and is an undesirable place to be.
CTD/GBCD is formulating an approach to encourage low and moderate
income residents to remain in subsidized developments, by helping them
to create a more satisifying housing environment and to cope with
rising housing costs.
During the two year period HUD would provide financial assistance
toward transfer of ownership. The management fee would be set at
eight percent of gross rents, instead of the usual five percent. Sub-
sidized housing management fees have not been sufficient, especially
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in central city areas where tenant needs are greater. The increased
fee would allow for adequate management.
CTD/GBCD would, according to the model, acquire properties from
HUD that presently have little or no potential for sale on the open
market. CTD/GBCD is currently negotiating an acquisition price that
could be supported by conventional financing. HUD's existing acqui-
sition price formula has not reflected the higher interest rate
required by conventional financing institutions. This has resulted
in sale prices that cannot be supported by conventional means. CTD/
GBCD has proposed a new formula that would better reflect the current
higher interest rates. A more realistic sale price would result in
rent levels affordable to residents.
CTD/GBCD has also proposed that HUD provide the necessary funds
for repairs in this Roxbury development, averaging $1,800 per apart-
ment. The price of the buildings would be set at one half of the cost
of repairs, plus the cost of operational deficits, minus net income
returned to HUD, for the two year interim management period.r
This price setting method would motivate potential owners to
minimize repair costs and to keep operating deficits at a minimum.
The amortization payment on the sale would be generated from increased
income from decreased arrearages, vacancies, and increased tenant
participation in maintenance and management. Making repair funds
($1,800 per apartment) available in the beginning would eliminate main-
tenance deficiencies that have plagued the buildings. The provision
of funds for needed repairs is the essential part of the overall
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strategy for dealing with the problems of these buildings.
The necessary funds for the planning and implementation of this
program would come from the Ford Foundation. The transfer of pro-
perties in a small area, such as this in Roxbury, would allow for
better control by tenants, and make for a more livable project. The
key to success is the change in tenant attitude regarding their en-
vironment, for which they would have responsibility as owners. It is
hoped that this pilot program will be successful, thereby creating
new policies to deal with subsidized housing.
The drawback of cooperativly owned developments is the inability
to guard against irresponsible members of the cooperative. A develop-
ment under a coopertive arrangement could rapidly deteriorate with
high vacancy rates or with delinquency of rent payments on the part of
even a small number of tenants.
But on the other hand, cooperative housing offers a relatively
simple way for families to own their own homes. Home ownership not
only engenders a sense of pride and stability, but a home also is the
one long-term investment a family is most likely to make. The CTD/
GBCD tenant ownership proposal would give low and moderate income
families the opportunity to own a home.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS: NEW ALTERNATIVES
The present system under the Section 236 program does not foster
responsible long-term ownership/management. Given the major role
that HUD and the MHFA play in the area of subsidized multi-family
housing, there should be program restructuring to insure that the
needs of low and moderate income families are met. There could be
a change in the ownership format of multi-family projects; and new
financial incentives and subsidies are needed to obtain responsible
long-term operation and management of subsidized units.
The current tax structure provides limited dividend sponsors
with financial incentives to develop projects, but the resulting tax
shelter benefits are usually depleted after fifteen to twenty years.
The cash flow becomes a negative incentive to continue owning a sub-
sidized multi-family project, once the tax benefits have been ex-
hausted. While non-profit sponsors are not affected in any way by the
tax shelter system, they do not generally have sufficient skills and
financial resources to absorb the cost of ongoing project management.
The HOMES Proposal
In an effort to find a way to insure responsible long-term owner-
ship/management of subsidized housing for the future, a study done by
the National Center For Housing Management, Inc. examines an entirely
new ownership system for subsidized multi-family housing projects.I
Under this proposal, sponsors would be given financial incentives to
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both initiate and responsibly manage subsidized multi-family projects
over the whole forty year term of a mortgage.
Under this system, which would be based on regulatory controls
and cash incentive, the Housing Ownership Management Entities (HOMES)4
would not realize automatic and arbitrary financial gains or losses
by virtue of the tax system. Instead, the amount of income that each
HOME earned would be dependent on how well it actually performed its
ownership/management role over a full forty year term. HOME owner-
ship could be implemented for developments under HUD or the MHFA (or
other State housing finance agencies) - new developments, those a few
years old, or even those that have been foreclosed.
Restructuring Financial Incentives
Under the proposal for ownership, there would be a restructuring
of financial incentives. To reduce risk during the construction per-
iod, sponsors could be responsible for their own interim construction
financing. Sponsors under HOMES would be forced to depend on their
reputations and internal strengths in order to receive loans from par-
ticular mortgagees. Since there would be no guarantees or construc-
tion financing from government housing agencies, the interim lender
would take a more active role in monitoring the sponsors to make sure
the project could be built for the estimated costs. HUD and the MHFA
would provide the permanent take-out mortgage once the project were
completed and met specifications.
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The disadvantage of this conventional construction financing
is that developments would not have the lower interim financing
interest that is available from the MHFA or federal financing. The
savings in interest cost could be plowed back into the development
to improve its quality.
One hundred percent financing of the permanent mortgage could
be supplied. In the past, limited dividend sponsors have pledged
their developers' fees (BSPRA) as equity and profit has been ob-
tained by the syndication of their interest. The equity requirement
is in reality only "paper equity".
Currently, the time when developments are to be refinanced is
after twenty years of operation. Because of this long lock-in period,
future proceeds from refinancing are not very attractive to investors.
Refinancing occurs so far in the future that sponsors are not encou-
raged to add funds to developments. The lock-in period for refinan-
cing could be shortened to ten to fifteen years, to allow a greater
possibility of obtaining refinancing proceeds. The shorter lock-in
period would encourage investors to allocate cash for improvements in
developments, to retain their market value.
Bonus System
To insure good management, there must be sufficient rewards.
Management bonuses have been suggested by MHFA staff as a means of
insuring long-term responsible management. A bonus plan suggested
by the National Center For Housing calls for ownership reserves of ten
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percent of the total project replacement cost, to be held by the
federal government and reinvested to generate interest. After the
third year of operation, the return on the reserves could be utilized
to pay an additional ownership/management bonus. If management has
difficulty operating the project, it would be required to use the
bonus to meet project expenses. The amount of bonus would increase
over time.
The MHFA and HUD could reinvest funded replacement reserves and
the interest generated could be used as a potential management bonus.
A ten percent reserve of total replacement cost would raise rents
five to seven dollars per apartment, based on a three percent constant
on the mortgage. The bonus that management could generate on each
apartment would be about $150.00 per unit.
For especially troublesome developments in central cities, HUD
and the MHFA could increase ownership reserves to fifteen percent of
the total replacement cost; thus additional bonuses could be generated
to attract responsible management/ownership.
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Figure 1.
Replacement Cost, Mortgage and Stated Equity
Land Improvements
Construction of building
Total stuctures
Architects' fees-
$ 22,500
1,000,000
1,022,500
design and supervision 56,423
Bond premium 5,293
Interest during construction period
@ 812% 57,375
Taxes 8,000
Insurance
FHA mortgage insurance
premium (%)
FHA examination fee (.3%)
FHA inspection fee (L%)
Financing fee (2%)
FNMA fee (1 3/4%)
Title and recording
Legal and organization
Other costs
4, 000
6,750
4,050
6,750
27,000
23,625
6,000
8,800
15,404
1. Total certifiable cost
2. Other cost elements-not cost certifiable:
Builder's general overhead (2% of
structure costs) $ 20,757 (TD)
3. Land-market value
per FHA 100,000
4. Total cost exculding BSPRA
5. Allowance by FHA for Builder and
Sponsor Profit & Risk (BSPRA)
(10% of the sume of certifiable
costs plus builder's general
overhead allowance)
6. Total Estimated Replacement Cost
7. Mortgage-90% of Item 6
120,757
$1,372,727
127,273
$1,500,000
$1,350,000
8. "Stated Equity"-10% of
Replacement Cost $ 150,000
(TD) = Tax deductible items during
construction period ($143,507)
Source: National Association of Home Builders, October
1970. 124
(TD)
(TD)
(TD)
(TD)
(TD)
(TD)
$1,251,970
Figure 2.
Profit if Builder-Sponsor Sells Property
Sales Price (replacement cost)
Costs:
Mortgage-Figure 1
Actual investment
$1,500,000
$1,350,0OO
63,227
Total cost
Profit to builder-sponsor
After taxes-assume 50o bracket
1,413,227
$ 86,773
$ 43,387
Source: National Association of Home Builders,
October 1970.
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Figure 3
Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency
Design Specifications
. space set aside for community functions; toilet facilit-
ies should be provided as part of this area. Storage fa-
cilities and ventilated laundry facilities should also
be included.
. recreation facilities should be included as a part of
its overall design. Some examples are: tennis courts,
basketball courti, swimming pools, shop with lockers for
tools, photography darkroom, exercise room, sauna,etc.
These facilities should be carefully thought out and
related to the size of the project and the type of
tenants.
. Three and four bedroom apartments should not begin over
1 1/2 stories from the ground.
. Buildings taller than 3 1/2 stories should have elevators.
. All apartments should provide a refrigerator, range and
disposal.
. Three bedroom apartments should have at least 1 1/2
baths and four bedrooms and larger 2 baths.
. Three bedroom apartments and larger should have a den
or'a dining room separate from- the kitchen.
. Any project with more than 100 bedrooms should provide
a pirogram and facilities for children's day care.
. Any existing exposed brick, interior or exterior, will
be steam-cleaned or sand-blasted and completely repointed.
. No plywood or concrete block products should be used as
an exterior wall material, except as fencing.
. All bathrooms should have ceramic tile on the floor and
ceramic tile around tub. Fiberglass tubs, vinyl asbestos
tile or carpet flooring are not acceptable in bathrooms.
. Shelves and by-folding doors shall not be made of metal.
Source:Operations Handbook For Financing Of Multi-Dwelling
Housing, Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency,
Boston, Mass., December, 1974.
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Figure 4.
Tenant Selection Criteria
The following priorities will be the basis for
resident selection for all applicants at all income levels.
The priorities are listed in order of preference and are
subject to whatever Federal or State priorities are or
may be imposed.
I. Displacement with a two-year period.
A. Due to natural disaster, fire, public
action or urban renewal.
B. Due to private eviction beyond the
control of the resident.
II. -Poor housing conditions.
A. Substantial substandardness.
B. Overcrowded conditions.
III. Rent in excess of So of applicant's
adjusted annual income.
IV. Special personal situations
A. Handicapped.
B. In military service where head of
household is stationed away from home
V. Applicants who receive public assistance will
take priority over any of the above priority
categories if the selection based on the
categories 1 through 4 results in the follow-
ing:
non-compliance with MHFA regulations
that at least 25% of the low income
units shall be for wefare recipients.
Source: Resident Selection Process, Massachusetts Housing
Finance Agency, Boston, Mass., June, 1974.
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OPERATING COST ANALYSES
POWER PAYROLLPro ject
A.
13.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
I.
J.
K.
L.
M.
N.
0.
P.
Q.
R.
S.
T.
81
115
171
176
175
141
104
184
222
135
188
257
.190
75
182
127
221
137
254
- - ,~.,, rrir~m~r
- OPER + YIT.
176
239
275
270
124
235
216
181
224
' .212.
298
152
217
275
144
171
273
436
348
481
256
354
446
446
300
376
320
365
446
347
487
409
407
350
326
298
494
573
602
481
137
139
156
255
181
105
151
188
201
178
207
156
175
112
136
122
191
145
200
33
J-IhJ.L diJ j
827
943
- 1085
1119.
1119
946
924
1222
* 1097
' 813
1157
1112
932
902
. 968
779
1170
1329
1345
1181
Source: The Peport of the Pause Comrittee, Massachusetts Housing Fiance Agency,
Boston, Mass., October 2, 1974.
434
449
483
418
638
465
451
669
451
288
464
548
350
440
506
358
485
611
543
667
SIZE
214
.156
190
149
449
110
288
404
71
160
204
312
100
250
288
134
33
147
32
9
AVG.i#
n4 T
1.14
1.33
1.46
1.47
1.56
1.64
1.69
1.74
1.86
1.89
1.90
1.92
1.96
2.
2.13
2.27
2.55
2.58
2.84
3.33
Figure 5.1
U.V'- /" NT 1iL'l
,oavroll
1 a1 -A 1'iII
PER UNIT IMPACT OF RECENT COST JNCREASES
Project POWER INCREASE
PER UNIT -
PAYROLL INCREASE
PER UNIT
POWER INCREASE
AS % OF TOTAL
INCREASE
PAYROLL INCREAS
AS % OF TOTAL
INCREASE
-9.8%
15
.'20.6
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
I.
J.
K.
L.
M.
N.
O.
P.
Q.
R.
S.
T.
Source: The Report of the Pause Cohmittee, Massachusetts Housing
Finance Agency, Boston, Mass., October 2, 1974.
238
224
168
128
360
193
139
469
203
40
259
273
140
226
177
27
246
276
199
404
18
14
73
17
79
52
10
68
123
34
119
182
95
5
3.8
41.6
* 17..'3
6.4
13.7
32.8
115.1
42.4
-7-45.5
39.1
1.6
41.6
44.5
32.8
12
30
13.7
129.4%
128.2
47
28.6
189
64.1
91.7
94.9
53.9
132.7
92.2
68.1
.57.6
68.4
64.1
17.6
15.6
57.1
78.8
110.9
67
157
58
76
50
Figure 5.2
I
RECENT PROJECT COST INCREASES
TOTAL INCREASE POWER INCREASE PAYROLL INCREASE
AMOUNT - % AMOUNT - % AMOUNT - %
39,400 - 7.9% 50,994 - 121.7% 3879 - 18%
27,284 - 6.5% 35,000 - 100% 4100 - 18.6%
67,867 - 11.7% 31,906 - 54.2% 14,006 - 76.1%
66,688 - 12.2% .19,100 
- 30.7% 2540 - 10.7%
85,386 - 6.5% 161,611 - 129.2% 35,540 - 84.2%
33,169 - 12.9% 21,273 - 71.3% 5732 - 58.5%
43,618 - 5.8% 40,000 - 44.4% 2800 - 10.3%
199643 - 19.1% 189.464 - 234.5 27,440 - 58.4
26,683 - 14.1 14,381 - 81.6. 8,750 - 125%
4,726 - 3.8 6,270 - 15.8 5440 - 33.8
57,335 - 11.4 52,850 - 126.4 24,330 - 173.3
124,814 - 21.9 85,060 - 99% 56,815 - 243%
24,'285 - 9.9 14,000 - 66.7 9500 - 100%
82,659 - 12.5 56,550 - 105.8 1300 - 65*
PROJECT
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
I.
J.
K.
L.
M.
N.
0.
P.
Q.
R.
S.
T.
50,896 - 53.6 33flrfl - 17fl~~
20,224 - 6.2 3,571 - 6.9 9000 - 112.5
15,761 - 24.5 8,125 - 103.3 5175 - 245.8
71,088 - 17.3 40,615 - 82.6 8564 - 74.1
8,061 - 8.4 6,365 - 57.9 2420 - 42.3
3,283 - 13.4 3,640 - 154.2 450 - ----
Source: The Report of the Pause
Finance Agency, Boston,
Commit-Gee,
Mass., Oct
Massachuse ts Hot-sig)ber 2, 1974.
79,431 - 16.3
Figure 5.3
Figure 6 - Financial Assumptions
3.5 Million Total Replacement Cost
3.15 Million Mortgage
7% Interest Rate
125, 15%, 18% investment equity of mortgage
18 month construction periodt 87,000 expense for land
340,000 Tax Deduction expense during construction
40 year life
Sum of the Year Digits Depreciation Method.
Investor owns 10% interest in the development
Figure 7 and 8 - Financial Assumptions
1.5 Million Total Replacement Cost
1.35 Million Mortgage
7% Interest Rate
12%, 15%, 18% investment equity of mortgage
12 month construction period
112,000 expense of land
150,000 Tax Deduction expense during construction
33 year life
Sum of the Year Digits Depreciation Method.
Forebearance of 75% of the Debt Service
Investor owns 10% interest in the development
Figure 9 and10 - Financial Assumptions
1,213,444 Total Replacement Cost
1,092,100 Mortgage
7% Interest Rate
24% investment equity of mortgage
12 month construction period
$152,000 Tax deductible expenses during construction
5 year depreciation period for $835,915
125% declining-balance method of depreciation on $246,675
building shell
Forebearance of 75% of the Debt Service
Investor owns 10% interest in the development
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- Financial Assumptions
Same assumptions as in Figure 6 and 7 except:
One investor own 100% of the project
100% mortgage remains
4% investment equity of mortgage
125% of straight line depreciation taken
Conversion to Limited Dividend Project after 2 years of
operation.
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Fl:igure 1i1
Figure 6 Investors' Net Unrecovered Investment After Tax on Foreclosure
NEW HIGH RISE APARTHENTS
Assuming Investor
Net Unrecovered
Investment
Before
Foreclosure
ts Subject to Tax Preference Items
Tax Burden Net
of Unrecovered.
Foreclosure Investment
Unrecovered
Net Investment
as a % of
Original Investment
2-yea8 foraclosurs
50% tax bracket
60% tax bracket
707 tax bracket
S-year foreclosure
50% tax bracket
60% tax bracket
70% tax bracket
8-year foreclosure
50% tax bracket
60% tax bracket
701 tax bracket
15% Investment
2-year foreclosure
50% tax bracket
60% tax bracket
70% tax bracket
5-year foreclosure
50% tax bracket
60% tax bracket
70% tax bracket
8-year forec losure
50% tax bracket
60% tax bracket
70%X tax bracket
18% Investment
2-year foreclosure
50 tax bracket
60% tax bracket
707 tax bracket
5-year foreclosure
50% tax bracket
60% tax bracket
707. tax bracket
8-year foreclosure
50% tax bracket
60% tax bracket
707 tax bracket
Original
Cash
Investment
Tax Benefits
Received to
Date of
Foreclosure-
$37,800
37,800
37,800
37,800
37,800
37,800
37,800
37,800
37,800
47,250
47,250
47,250
47,250
47,250
47,250
47,250
47,250
47,250
56,700
56,700
56,700
56,700
56,700
56,700
56,700
56,700
56,700
$31,821
38,505.
45,189
46,232
56,164
66,097
58,715
71,444
84,174
32,282
39,068
45,853
47,271
57,433
67,594
60,292
73,368
86,441
32,744
39,631
46,520
48,310
58,703
69,095
61,868
75,293
88,714
$5,979
(705)
(7,389)
(8,432)
(18,364)
(28,297)
(20,915)
(33,644)
(46,374)
14,968
8,182
1,397
(21)
(10,183)
(20,344)
(13,042)
(26,118)
(39,191)
23,956
17,069
10,180
8,390
(2,003)
(12,395)
(5,168)
(18,593)
(32,014)
$13,103
14,589
16,075
26,575
28,533
30,492
36,840
37,876
38,913
9,776
11,308
12,839
23,771
25,789
27,808
34,474
35,542
36,610
6,091
7,309
8,528
20,967
23,045
25,124
32,109
33,209
34,308
$19,082
13,884
8,686
18,143
10,169
2,195
15,925
4,232
(7,461)
24,744
19,490
14,236
23,750
15,606
7,464
21,432
9,424
(2,581)
30,047
24,378
18,708
29,357
21,042
12,729
26,941
14,616
2,294
50.48
36,73
22,98
44.00
26.90
5,81
42.13
11.20
(19.74)
52.37
41.25
30.13
50.26
33.03
15.80
45.36
19.94
(5.46)
52.99
42.99
32.99
51.78
37.11
22,45
47.51
25,78
4.05
Figure 7
Net Benefits to Investor of Remaining in Project Under
2-Year Forbearance as Opposed to Being Foreclosed
NEW CARDEN APARTHENTS
ASSUMING INVESTOR IS SUBJECT TO TAX
Assuming Forbearance Policy
Benefits of
Future Operating
Tax Losses
Tax Burden of
Gain on Final
Disposition
Benefit Lese
Burden-
PREFERENCE I1
Tax Burden
if Project Net Benefit
is of Reaining
Foreclosed in Project
2-year assignment
50%.tax bracket
607. tax bracket
70% tax bracket
5-year assignment
50% tax bracket
60% tax bracket
70% tax bracket
8-year assignment
50% tax bracket
607. tax bracket
70% tax bracket
157 Investment
2-year assignment
50% tax bracket
607, tax bracket
70% tax bracket
S-year assignment
50. tax bracket
60X tax bracket
70% tax bracket
S-year assignrunt
50% tax bracket
60% tax bracket
70% tax bracket
WLInstm nt
2-year assignment
50 tax bracket
60% tax bracket
707 tax bracket
5-year assignment
50% tax bracket
607. tax bracket
70% tax bracket
8-year assignment
50% tax bracket
607 tax bracket
70% tax bracket
Source: Kenneth Leventhal & Company,
HUD Contract No. H-3859, 1975.
Tax Result Models,
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$21,855
26,643
31,430
16,665
20,276
23,894
11,804
14,335
16,869
19,163
23,376
27,585
13,905
16,809
19,964
9,012
10,955
12,901
19,865
24,224
28,586
14,463
17,612
20,760
9,430
11,463
13,491.
$10,352
10,352
10,352
11,869
11,869
11,869
13,657
13,657
13,657
10,732
10,732
10,732
12,314
12,314
12,314
14,173
14,173
14,173
10,602
10,602
10,602
12,163
12,163
12,163
13,998
13,998
13,998
$11,503
16,291
21,078
4,796
8,407
12,025
(1,853)
678
3,212
8,431
12,644
16,853
1,591
4,495
7,650
(5,161)
(3,218)
(1,272)
9,263
13,622
17,984
2,300
5,449
8,597
(4,568)
(2,535)
(507)
$5,680
6,346
7,011
12,451
13,39b
14,330
17,549
18,086
18,623
4,551
5,234
5,917
11,537
12,501
13,465
16,812
17,363
17,914
3,404
4,084
4,765
10,624
11,612
12,600
16,075
16,640
17,205
$17,183
22,637
28,089
17,247
21,798
26,355
15,696
18,764
21,835
12,982
17,878
22,770
13,128
16,996
21,115
11,651
14,145
16,642
12,667
17,706
22,749
12,924
17,061
21,197
11,507
14,105.
16,698
Figure 8 lavestora' Wet Unrecovered Itvestment After Tax on foreclosure
NW CARDEN APARTMENTS
Assuming Investor
Net Unrecovere4
Investment
Rofors,
Is Subject to Tax Preference Items
Ta% Burdep pot
of Naroserod
forelesuyj EIeSLteentL
Unrecovered
ntt Iavtme nt
%, of1
2-year foreclosure
501 tax bracket
60% tax bracket
70% tax bracket
5-year foreclosure
50% tax bracket
607. tax bracket
70% tax bracket
S-year foreclosure
50% tax bracket
60% tax bracket
70% tax bracket
15% Investment
2-year foreclosure
50% tax bracket
60% tax bracket
70% tax bracket
5-year foreclosure
501 tax bracket
60% tax bracket
70% tax bracket
8-year foreclosure
50% tax bracket
60% tax bracket
707. tax bracket
1IM Investment
2-year foreclosure
507. tax bracket
60% tax bracket
70% tax bracket
5-year foreclosure
50% tax bracket
60% tax bracket
70% tax bracket
8-year foreclosure
50% tax bracket
60% tax bracket
701 tax bracket
Original,
Csh
1=111128n1
Tax Benefits
Receive4 to
poto of
force osure
$16,200
16,200
16,200
16,200
16,200
16,200
16,200
16,200
16,200
20,250
20,250
20,250
20,250
20,250
20,250
20,250
20,250
20,250
24,300
24,300
24,300
24,300
24,300
24,300
24,300
24,300
24,300
$13,674
16,548-
19,421
20,922
25,418
29,915
27,124
32,997
38,868.
14,249
17,241
20,232
21,733
26,400
31,068
28,153
34,241
40,330
14,824
17,934
'21,045
22,545
27,384
32,223
29,181
35,487
41,795
(348)
(3,221)
(4,722)
(9,218)
(13,715)
(10,924)
(16.797)
(22,668)
6,001
3,009
18
(1,483)
(6,150)
(10,818)
(7,903)
(13,991)
(20,080)
9,476
6,366
3,255
1,755
(3,084)
(7,923)
(4,881)
(11,187)
(17,495)
* 5,060
6,346
7,011
12,451
13,391
14,330
17,549
18,086
18,623
4,551
5,234
5,917
11,537
12,501
13,465
16,812
17,363
17,914
3,404
4,084
4,765
10,624
11,612
12,600
16,075
16,640
17,205
e e,ao
'5,998
. 3,790
7,729
4,173
615
6,625
1,289
(4,045)
10,552
8,243
5,935
10,054
6,351
2,647
8,909
3,372
(2,166)
12,880
10,450
8,020
12,379
8,528
4,677
11,194
5,453
(290)
0o.es
37.02
23,40
47.71
25.76
3,80
40.90
7.96
(24.9.7)
52.11
40,71
.29.31
49.65
31.36
13.07
44.00
16.65
(10.70)
53.00
43.00
33.00
50.94
35.09
19.25
46.07
22.44
(1.19)
Figure 9
Investors' Net Unrecovered Investment After Tax on Foreclosure
RIS4ILITATION - SCATTERED SITES
-Assuming Inveeyor
met Unrecovered
Investment
Before
Fore2losure -
It Subject to Tax ?reference Items
Tax Burden
of
Foree loeure
Net
Unteeoverd
Knvestuent
Unrecorded
Net Investment
a@ a of
Ori2inal Inves~tMen
141 lnveutment
2-year foreclosure
50% tax bracket
60% tax bracket
70% tax bracket
Source: Kenneth Leventhal
No. H-3859, 1975.
& Company, Tax Result Models, HUD Contract
Original
Cash
Invesaan"
Tax Benefits
Received to
Date of
Forg losure
$26,208
26,208
26,208
$25,681
31,512
37,344
$ 527
(5,304)
(11,136)
$16,006
19,170
22,334
$16,533
13,866
11,198
63.08
52.90
42.72
Figure 10
Net Benefits to Investor of Remaining in Project Under
a 2 Year or a Lifetime Forbearance Policy as
Opposed to Being Foreclosed
REWABILITATION - SCATTERED SITES
ASSUMING INVESTOR IS SUBJECT TO TAX PREEREIE ITEMS
Assuming Forbearance Policy
Tax Burden of
Gain on Final
DisnesWItis
Benefits of
Fdtura Operating
ZAN L81121
Benefit Lose
Tax Burden
it Project
is
2-year Forbearance
Accrual
50% tax bracket
60% tax bracket
70X tax bracket
Cash
50% tax bracket
60% tax bracket
70% tax bracket
24% INVESTMENT
Lifetime Forbearance
Accrual
50% tax bracket
60% Lax bracket
70% tax bracket
Cash
50X tax bracket
60% tax bracket
70% tax bracket
$16,191
20,093
23,986
15,066
18,742
22,413
31,693
38,686
46,517
17,887
22,119
26,350
$12,198
12,198
12,198
11,412
11,412
11,412
20,412
20,412
20,412
12,952
12,952
12,952
Source: Kenneth Leventhal & Company, T
HUD Contradt No. H-3859, 1975.
$ 3,993
7,895
11,788
3,654
7,330
11,001
11,281
18,274
26,105
4,935
9,167
13,398
$16,006 $19,999
19,170 27,065
22,334 34,122
16,006
19,170
22,334
16,006
19,170
22,334
16,006
19.170
22,334
19,660
26,500
33,335
27,287
37,444
48,439
20,941
28,337
35,732
ax Result Models,
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set Be418it
of Remaining
in treat
Figure 11
Anticipated Tax Results to Prospective New Investors
in a Non-Profit Section 236 Project Which is Reconstituted
as a Limited Dividend Section 236 Project
Including Tax Preference Items
Tax Burden
Tax Benefits on Disposition Net Benefit
Excluding Tax Preference Items
Tax Burden
Tax Benefits on Disposition
DISPOSITION IN 1978 (A)
Accrual Basis
50% tax bracket
60% tax bracket
70% tax braekat
Cash Basis
50% tax bracket
60% tax bracket
70% tax bracket
$188,624
227,045
265,470
107,327
129,490
151,653
594,923
714,629
834,341
302,350
363,545
424,736
DISPOSITION IN 1991 (B)
Accrual Basis
50% tax bracket
60% tax bracket
70% tax bracket
Cash Basis
30% tax bracket
60% tax bracket
70% tax Bracket
4(131,747)
(133,837)
(135,928)
$ 56,877
-93,208
129,542
(66,739) 40,588
(68,829) 60,661
(70,920) 80,733
(454,808)
(454,808)
(454,808)
$192,109
230,531
268,954
110,812
132,974
155,137
598,542
718,249
837,959
305,969
367,163
428,354
140,115
259,821
379,533
(220,779) 81,371
(220,779) 142,766
(220,779) 203,957
$(116,586)
(118,676)
(120,767)
(59,704)
(61,794)
(63,885)
(397,957)
(397,957)
(397,957)
$ 75,523
111,655
148,167
51,108
71,180
91,252
200,585
320,292
440,002
(19,182) 112,787
(193,182) 173,981
(193,182) 235,172
(A) Assumes a foreclosure in 1978.
(8) Assumes a final disposition in 1991
for the mortgage amount.
Source: Kenneth Leventhal & Company, Tax Result
HUD Contract No. H-3859, 1975.
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